On Aug. 27, the Legislative Yuan passed a six-year, NT$240 billion (US$7.3 billion) act for the development and procurement of unmanned vehicles, as well as the development of Taiwan’s indigenous drone industry.
The KMT-backed version replaces the Cabinet’s original NT$210 billion (US$6.5 billion) special procurement proposal, which would have run through 2031.
The act provides a framework to fund the three types of unmanned systems that the Ministry of National Defense deemed crucial: coastal attack drones, coastal reconnaissance drones, and small one-way attack unmanned surface vehicles.
While finally overcoming the deadlock over a vital component of Taiwan’s national security should be welcomed, it is impossible to ignore that, as with the special defense budget passed in May, the KMT has once again weaponized national security through delays, cuts, and reshaped plans.
The last-minute addition of the three unmanned systems identified as critical by the MND, the persistent funding uncertainty that risks discouraging drone manufacturers, and the likelihood of further delays are all signs of the same problem: the KMT does not seem to consider how its actions undermine Taiwan’s readiness.
A flawed act
The problem lies in the difference between money announced and money made available. Although NT$240 billion appears more generous than the Cabinet’s NT$210 billion proposal, the two figures are not directly comparable.
First, the new act places the funding within the regular annual budget process, with approximately NT$40 billion to be allocated each year for six years. Additional expenditure remains possible, but it will require further legislative approval.
The Cabinet’s proposal instead concentrated special-budget funding on the acquisition, production, maintenance, engineering, and training of the three unmanned systems previously mentioned, leaving the funding of other large and medium-to-large drones to be included separately in annual budgets or other procurement programs.
Procurement also becomes less precise. Unlike the Cabinet’s plan, which requested funding for 208,200 attack drones, 1,446 reconnaissance drones, and 1,320 unmanned surface vehicles, the new act contains no procurement numbers.
Second, the new framework has a much broader mandate, also covering industrial development and testing facilities. Consequently, the larger headline figure does not necessarily translate into more money for the systems identified by the military as its most urgent requirements.
The KMT has therefore transformed what could have been one multi-year funding decision into a series of annual negotiations. Every budget cycle will offer another opportunity to delay procurement, reduce individual programs, or demand that the government reshape its plans.
To justify this approach, the KMT argues that annual reviews will strengthen oversight and allow the military to adjust its purchases as drone technology evolves.
Recent experience provides little reason to trust that this mechanism will progress smoothly. The Cabinet submitted the 2026 central government budget on Aug. 31, 2025.
The Legislative Yuan did not pass it until Aug. 14, 266 days after the statutory deadline.
During that dispute, the KMT threatened to cut drone-related funding by 70% before eventually approving the full amount. Its reversal is welcome, but this final approval does not erase the uncertainty created for ministries and manufacturers during almost a year of political deadlock.
The same pattern shaped the special defense budget passed in May. The opposition reduced the government’s proposed ceiling from NT$1.25 trillion to NT$780 billion and, by excluding domestic drone programs, seriously weakened Taiwan’s drone industry and capabilities.
The passage of the drone act therefore seeks to resolve a problem that the earlier opposition-backed legislation helped create. It also leaves future funding exposed to the same political process.
Taiwan’s drone industry and asymmetric readiness cannot afford annual funding delays that undermine the industrial guarantees and political clarity manufacturers need to scale up drone production.
Moreover, it increases pressure on the MND, which may be forced to adapt to procurement cycles different from those it originally envisioned, while diluted funding could reshape its capability-development plans.
The issue therefore reaches beyond the design of the act. By potentially exposing capabilities considered urgent by the MND to repeated political delays, the KMT’s approach raises a broader question about the responsibility that comes with legitimate legislative opposition.
National security should be a key consideration
Far be it from me to suggest that the Legislative Yuan should blindly follow any policy from the government, or that the act does not support Taiwan’s asymmetric preparedness.
The KMT has every right to oppose the government and defend its position, and the DPP’s defense vision should remain open to scrutiny.
Nobody should want one-party rule in Taiwan. However, legitimate opposition still carries a responsibility to consider the consequences of repeated delays for national security.
The new act is a positive outcome, and it can strengthen Taiwan’s drone industry and asymmetric preparedness if its funding is delivered on time. However, each future delay will be a political choice with direct consequences for Taiwan’s national defense.
What is apparent with the act is that the KMT has embraced the popular appeal of funding drones while preserving repeated opportunities to use delays as political leverage, even if this means endangering Taiwan’s national security.
This raises serious questions about the party’s credibility on national defense issues and makes accusations of alignment with Beijing increasingly difficult to disregard.
It remains to be hoped that the KMT will finally understand that political competition does not need to come at the expense of Taiwan’s national security.
