Driven by China’s growing assertiveness and converging economic and strategic interests, the European Union and Taiwan no longer regard security engagement as taboo.
Over the past decade, the European Union has expanded ties with Taiwan beyond traditional economic engagement to include technology, tourism, semiconductors, supply chain resilience, and security-related cooperation.
Reflecting this transformation, the European Parliament in July adopted a resolution calling for closer cooperation with partners in East Asia. The resolution mentioned Taiwan 44 times and reaffirmed opposition to “any coercive or unilateral change of the status quo” in the Taiwan Strait.
This highlights the EU’s growing recognition of Taiwan’s importance not only as an economic and technological partner, but also as a stakeholder in maintaining peace, stability, and the rules-based order in the Indo-Pacific.
Political Engagement Deepens
While contacts between European countries and Taiwan date back to the 17th century, contemporary engagement began in 1971 with the establishment of the Dr. Sun Yat-sen Cultural Center in Belgium, which was renamed the Taipei Representative Office in 2001.
The opening of the European Economic and Trade Office in Taipei in 2003 marked a watershed moment by institutionalizing unofficial relations between Taiwan and the EU.
A significant shift came after President Tsai Ing-wen (蔡英文) assumed office in 2016. Her participation in the European Day celebration that year symbolized growing political engagement.
The EU reciprocated by sending its first parliamentary delegation to Taiwan in 2021, led by Raphael Glucksmann. In 2022, European Parliament Vice President Nicola Beer met Tsai in Taipei, further strengthening political exchanges.
Then-Foreign Minister Joseph Wu (吳釗燮) broke diplomatic convention by traveling to Prague, Brussels, and Milan in June 2023 and holding meetings with European parliamentarians and EU officials.
The first pan-European Green Party delegation, led by Reinhard Butikofer, a member of the European Parliament from Germany, visited Taipei in 2024. Former President Tsai embarked on a high-stakes tour of the Czech Republic, France, and Belgium in October 2024.
In November 2025, Vice President Hsiao Bi-khim (蕭美琴) made history as the first sitting Taiwanese vice president to deliver a speech inside the European Parliament building in Brussels.
In January 2026, a 10-member delegation led by Michael Gahler, chair of the European Parliament-Taiwan Friendship Group, visited Taiwan. Foreign Minister Lin Chia-lung (林佳龍) also conducted diplomatic pushes across Europe, including trips to the Czech Republic, Italy, and Austria in September 2025, followed by visits to Poland and Italy in June 2026.
These exchanges have contributed to the gradual institutionalization of political engagement between Taiwan and the EU.
Economic Convergence Drives Ties
Growing cooperation between the EU and Taiwan is rooted in converging economic interests.
After years of concern over Beijing’s unfair trade practices, market distortions, and the EU’s trade deficit with China, Brussels has increasingly adopted a de-risking strategy to reduce excessive economic dependence on Beijing.
Taiwan has emerged as a trusted partner because of its market-based economy, strong intellectual property protections, transparent regulatory system, and democratic governance.
The COVID-19 pandemic further highlighted Taiwan’s strategic importance by exposing Europe’s vulnerability to semiconductor supply chain disruptions, particularly in the automobile sector.
In response, the EU has strengthened institutional cooperation with Taipei. The European Parliament’s 2021 report on EU-Taiwan political relations and cooperation was followed by the elevation of the Taiwan-EU Trade and Investment Dialogue to the ministerial/director-general level in 2022.
These initiatives have generated tangible economic outcomes. One such project is the 10 billion euros (NT$368.7 billion) European Semiconductor Manufacturing Company joint venture in Dresden, in which TSMC holds a 70% stake alongside Bosch, Infineon, and NXP, each with a 10% stake.
The project demonstrates the complementarity between Taiwan’s technological expertise and Europe’s ambition to strengthen semiconductor resilience.
In 2024, semiconductors and electronic components accounted for around 23% of Taiwan’s exports to the EU, while bilateral trade reached 76.2 billion euros, making the EU Taiwan’s fifth-largest trading partner.
Ukraine War Spurs Reassessment
Russia’s war against Ukraine has further encouraged European engagement with Taiwan.
Many European governments view China’s political, economic, and technological support for Russia as a factor enabling Moscow to sustain its military campaign. European countries have also expressed concerns over Beijing’s involvement in hybrid threats, including cyberattacks, espionage, and disinformation campaigns targeting government institutions and critical infrastructure.
Taiwan, by contrast, has aligned itself closely with the Western response by imposing sanctions on Russia and providing humanitarian assistance to Ukraine.
Despite its limited international space, Taiwan’s response has reinforced its image among European policymakers as a like-minded democratic partner committed to defending the rules-based international order.
Security Cooperation Is No Longer Taboo
Unlike in the past, security engagement with Taiwan is no longer considered politically taboo within the EU.
Although the EU continues to uphold its “one China” policy, cooperation with Taiwan on security-related issues has expanded steadily. Since 2021, the European Parliament has adopted several resolutions supporting closer cooperation with Taiwan on cybersecurity, maritime security, countering disinformation, and protecting critical infrastructure.
The 2024 Common Foreign and Security Policy resolution reaffirmed Taiwan as a key EU partner and a vibrant democracy in the Indo-Pacific while encouraging deeper cooperation with Taipei.
Although these initiatives do not amount to formal security commitments, they indicate a significant evolution in Europe’s approach toward Taiwan.
This shift is also reflected in the policies of major European powers. The British, French, and German representative offices in Taipei issued a rare joint statement opposing Beijing’s intensified maritime activities around Taiwan and reaffirming support for freedom of navigation and the peaceful maintenance of the status quo in the Taiwan Strait.
European defense and aerospace companies have expanded cooperation with Taiwan in areas such as drone technology, secure supply chains, and energy security.
Europe’s growing recognition of the connection between European and Indo-Pacific security is further demonstrated by transits of French, German, Dutch, and British naval vessels through the Taiwan Strait since 2024.
Taiwan and the EU have also strengthened cooperation in cybersecurity, foreign information manipulation and interference, and critical infrastructure protection. The Taiwan-Poland cybersecurity memorandum of understanding signed in May 2026 represents another important step in this evolving security partnership.
The Way Forward
While new momentum has been infused into Taiwan-EU relations, the two sides still need to take more concrete steps to unleash the full potential of their cooperation.
Two priorities stand out. First, Taiwan and the EU should expand bilateral economic ties beyond semiconductors into fields such as artificial intelligence, green technology, digital governance, healthcare, and resilient supply chains.
Second, the EU should double down on its efforts to support Taiwan’s meaningful participation in international organizations, including the World Health Organization.
Taiwan and the EU have already moved beyond a relationship defined narrowly by trade. The task now is to turn growing political goodwill into a more durable framework for economic, technological, and security cooperation.
As China becomes more assertive and the Indo-Pacific grows more central to Europe’s own security, Taiwan should be treated not as a peripheral issue in EU-China relations, but as a key partner in defending a free and open regional order.
