Since regional capitals do not maintain official diplomatic relations with Taipei under the “one China” policy, formal maritime boundary coordination remains politically constrained.
That legal gap leaves two strategic flanks exposed: the flashpoint around Taiwan-administered Taiping Island in the Spratlys and the vital corridor east of Taiwan toward Japan’s Ryukyu archipelago.
To narrow that gap without provoking a crisis with Beijing, policymakers can draw on a proven model of creative diplomacy: the 2013 Taiwan-Japan Fisheries Agreement, negotiated under former President Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九) and former Prime Minister Abe Shinzo. The pact, finalized shortly after Chinese leader Xi Jinping assumed power, demonstrated how functional cooperation can proceed despite unresolved sovereignty disputes.
The agreement operationalized a core principle of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea. It states with overlapping claims that countries should pursue provisional, practical arrangements.
Its success rested on a clear design. A “without prejudice” clause preserved each side’s legal positions. Nominally private entities signed the accord, allowing both governments to sidestep diplomatic constraints.
A joint committee enabled routine coordination among maritime authorities. Instead of fixing a boundary, the sides defined a shared fishing zone governed by predictable rules, including flag-state enforcement to reduce the risk of confrontation.
Contested maritime zones
This framework offers a viable template for Taiping Island, Taiwan’s largest holding in the South China Sea — and a growing liability. The feature lies within contested maritime zones discussed by the Philippines and Vietnam, while Beijing has probed its status through incursions that test Taiwan’s control.
The 2016 arbitral ruling, which classified Spratly features as legally “rocks,” further complicated overlapping claims and hardened positions.
A starting point already exists. The 2015 Philippines-Taiwan law enforcement agreement, reached after a fatal shooting of a Taiwanese fisherman in 2013, established protocols on notification and the treatment of detained crews. Building on that mechanism, Manila and Taipei could negotiate a broader, non-governmental maritime cooperation pact.
Such an arrangement would embed “without prejudice” language, expand notification rules, and formalize rapid crew release procedures. It could designate a joint fishery and conservation zone around Taiping, with shared data systems and a prohibition on the use of force against civilian vessels. The goal is not to resolve sovereignty, but to manage risk and stabilize daily operations.
Securing Taiping alone, however, is insufficient. The effort must extend north to the Bashi Channel, where the interests of Taiwan, Japan and the Philippines converge.
Recent coordination between Tokyo and Manila has been met by intensified Chinese gray-zone activity, including large-scale maritime patrols and pressure on commercial shipping east of Taiwan.
Deadly mistakes
These actions underscore the risk of miscalculation in a corridor critical to regional trade and security. Taiwan’s Coast Guard has already rejected Beijing’s jurisdictional claims and warned local vessels against complying with unlawful boarding orders. The margin for error is narrowing.
A practical response is to scale the Japanese and Philippine precedents into a trilateral, non-governmental framework. Parallel agreements among Tokyo, Manila and Taipei could establish a contiguous maritime management zone stretching from the southern Ryukyus through the Bashi Channel to northern Luzon.
Linked surveillance and information-sharing systems would support coordinated coast guard patrols and scientific cooperation.
By aligning operational rules, the three parties would reduce opportunities for coercion and limit Beijing’s ability to exploit gaps between them. This is deterrence by denial in practice: a shared regime that makes gray-zone tactics less effective without escalating to formal alliance structures.
Criticism in Taiwan that such arrangements compromise sovereignty is likely to surface. But the precedent is clear.
Former President Ma’s East China Sea Peace Initiative advanced the same logic more than a decade ago by shelving disputes to enable cooperation. The 2013 and 2015 agreements show that pragmatic, non-sovereign frameworks can deliver stability where formal diplomacy cannot.
Expanding that approach would not settle competing claims. It would, however, impose order on contested waters and help secure a critical stretch of the First Island Chain.
