France’s official position is one of the most pro-China among European Union member states, but in reality the situation and its relationship with Taiwan is far more complex.
In 1991 and 1992 Taiwan bought six Lafayette-class frigates and 60 Mirage 2000-5 fighter jets from France. These arms sales resulted in a severe diplomatic backlash with Beijing.
Following the 1994 joint declaration between China and France, Paris not only accepted China’s stance that Taiwan is part of it but also promised not to allow French companies to support Taiwan’s armament.
France’s companies, however, have supported the modernization of the Lafayette frigates, operating as Kang Ding-class, in 2020, 2024, and 2026. Meanwhile, the Air Force just signed a NT$926.5 million (US$29.5 million) contract for the maintenance of the 54 remaining Mirage 2000-5 with Dassault Aviation.
Diplomatically, amid Europe’s growing effort to decouple from China and the deepening relationship between Taipei and Brussels, France has multiplied the statements regarding the importance of peace and stability in the strait. While the Taiwan-France relationship is steadily growing, a broader cooperation between Taipei and Paris could fill critical gaps in both their security strategies.
Taiwan could expand its procurement network and increase its European presence. Meanwhile, France’s Indo-Pacific strategy could be bolstered by a greater integration of Taipei in it, notably in the areas of AI development, freedom of navigation, and implementation of the EU Strategy for Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific.
What Taiwan can offer
France's updated Indo-Pacific strategy, published in July 2025, identifies semiconductor supply chain resilience and artificial intelligence as priority areas for digital sovereignty. Taiwan is a central actor in both, and Taiwanese investment is already materializing on French soil.
Notably, Foxconn has invested in a facility producing components for strategic industries in the defense and healthcare sectors, and in an AI server infrastructure, complementing Taiwan's involvement in France's battery sector.
As a result, Taipei is emerging as a key ally in France’s supply chain resilience strategy. Moreover, beyond technology, Taiwan's strategic geography is directly relevant to French interests.
France is one of the European powers with the most credible regional presence, sustained by its overseas territories and an active naval posture in the area.
As the PLA Navy's February 2025 live-fire exercises in the Coral and Tasman Seas demonstrated, China's growing blue-water capabilities are already reaching the maritime space surrounding New Caledonia, French Polynesia, and Wallis and Futuna — a trend that would only accelerate were Beijing to consolidate control beyond the First Island Chain.
Instability in the First Island Chain would have spillover effects for France by undermining freedom of navigation between its territories present between the Indian and Pacific oceans. Hence, upholding freedom of navigation in the region requires a broader cooperation with Taiwan.
For example, Taiwan and France established, in May 2025, a joint training on maritime firefighting emergency-response. Expanding such programs to information sharing and collaboration in countering China’s disinformation regarding navigation in the Taiwan Strait could reinforce France’s strategic goal while promoting Taiwan’s international integration.
Cyberattack central
This would also in turn support France’s objective of contributing actively to the implementation of the EU Strategy for Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific, which underlines that Taiwan’s issue could have a potential impact on the EU’s security and prosperity.
Another key area in which Taiwan can play a decisive role in France’s Indo-Pacific Strategy is cybersecurity, for which Paris emphasized the importance of regional cooperation. Taiwan, as the world’s most cyberattacked nation, can offer precious insights regarding how to increase digital resilience.
In sum, and despite structural constraints, there is a clear path on which Taiwan can occupy a more preeminent role into France’s regional strategy. This requires, however, treating Taiwan like the relevant stakeholder it is.
For Taiwan, deeper engagement with France would serve two distinct interests.
The first is procurement diversification. Taiwan's defense dependency on the US is becoming increasingly risky as Washington's reliability comes into question, and the structural absence of large-scale European alternative suppliers, as a consequence of decades of Chinese pressure on potential partners, leaves Taipei with limited options.
France is among the few European states with both the industrial capacity and the strategic interests to contribute meaningfully to stability in the Taiwan Strait.
For example, French companies are essential to ensure La Fayette frigates remain ready for combat. The frigates have been seriously upgraded in recent years, with a focus on radar and surface-to-air missile systems.
Future challenges
While French companies are supporting Taiwan in prolonging the lifespan of its fleet, both its air and navy fleets are aging.
Taiwan has already expressed interest in acquiring Rafale fighters to replace the Mirage fleet, but a sale remains unlikely as it would cross the line that Beijing has enforced since 1994 and that Paris has not shown willingness to challenge.
However, diversifying procurement is essential for ensuring that Taiwan’s army remains operative. The delays in the F-16V delivery that Taiwan’s Air Force is dealing with represent a striking example of how risky it is to rely solely on one partner.
Paris cannot by itself dispel the doubts cast by Washington, but could spearhead a common response within the EU. As Europe learns to be less cautious about engaging on military matters with Taiwan, a strong signal from a major EU power and permanent member at the UN Security Council could accelerate the process.
This would in turn serve the second interest for Taipei, as greater bilateral ties with Paris would expand Taiwan’s European integration.
In the past years, France and Taiwan have built science partnerships, while pro-Taiwan resolutions have been passed by the French lower house and diplomatic engagement is growing through official visits in both nations.
Future challenges
Amid Taiwan’s push for greater engagement with its European partners, more explicit support from Paris would sustain Taipei’s efforts. Ultimately, helping Taiwan’s democracy to succeed serves both France's and Europe’s interests, but this requires adopting a bolder policy.
Yet, despite diplomatic progress and military cooperation, enhancing Taiwan-France relations is not an easy task. The principal obstacle to deeper France-Taiwan cooperation operates at two levels. The first and most obvious one is China’s pressure.
The concessions made in 1994 enclose Paris’ range of actions within a very strict framework, that closely echoes the “one-China” principle, undermines Taiwan’s sovereignty, and precludes new-build arms sales.
Nonetheless, regarding arms sales, Taiwan should continue to discuss the issue as keeping it on the table maintains pressure and signals to Brussels that Taipei is an active participant in managing its own security.
The second constraint is France's domestic political landscape ahead of the 2027 presidential election, in which prominent candidates range from a strong opponent to Taiwan’s existence to one relatively indifferent to Taiwan, but who risks weakening France’s strength within the EU and thus diminishing Taipei’s efforts for greater integration.
Deepening relationship
Jean-Luc Melenchon, the La France Insoumise leader running for the presidency and who scored 21,95% during the first round of the 2022 presidential election, has continuously aligned with China’s narrative regarding Taiwan’s sovereignty.
In a recent interview, he declared that Chinese leaders were reasonable people, and that Taiwan has always been China.
Regarding Le Front National, which lost twice against President Macron, the future candidate for the 2027 presidential election is not yet known, as Marine Le Pen, daughter of the party’s founder, is currently banned from running for political office. What is known, however, is that neither Jordan Bardella, the current president of the party, nor Marine Le Pen have much consideration for Taiwan.
The 2027 presidential election will have direct consequences for Taiwan’s ability to engage with France, which makes deeper engagement with Paris an immediate priority.
Despite these constraints, the France-Taiwan relationship has steadily grown within the 1994 framework.
Taiwan has demonstrated it can offer France concrete assets in technology sovereignty, information warfare, and digital resilience. France, in turn, remains one of the few European states with both the industrial capacity and the regional presence to meaningfully support Taiwan's security and European integration.
Deepening that relationship before France's political landscape shifts further is in both countries' interest.
