At last year's Shangri-La Dialogue, US Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth warned of Beijing's growing military pressure and repeatedly referenced Taiwan, pledging that it would not fall on the Trump administration's watch.
One year later, the contrast could hardly be sharper. Taiwan disappeared entirely from Hegseth's speech on Sunday, replaced by the more abstract language of the "First Island Chain." Explicit warnings gave way to calls for "quiet strength" and "constructive strategic stability."
This rhetorical shift is not merely a matter of tone. It appears to reflect a broader shift in US policy following US President Donald Trump's May 13–15 summit with Xi Jinping in Beijing. Trump himself suggested the change when he reportedly described Taiwan's pending NT$444 billion (US$14 billion) arms package as a “bargaining chip” with China.
Meanwhile, the widely anticipated phone call between Trump and President Lai Ching-te (賴清德) — publicly referenced by Trump on at least two occasions — has yet to take place. Taken together, these developments suggest a deliberate effort by Washington to lower tensions with Beijing and reduce the risk of confrontation.
Even if one adopts the most charitable interpretation of this approach — that the administration is seeking to preserve peace rather than downgrade its commitment to Taiwan — the strategy rests on a questionable assumption.
Washington's objective is the preservation of the status quo. It seeks to maintain peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait while avoiding a costly conflict and preserving broader economic and diplomatic interests.
Status quo quandary
Beijing's objective, however, remains to change the status quo. Chinese leaders have repeatedly stated that Taiwan's incorporation into China is a central national goal.
In other words, both sides seek the lowest-cost path. Washington seeks the lowest cost for preserving the status quo, Beijing seeks the lowest cost for changing it.
This distinction matters because signals intended as restraint in Washington may be interpreted very differently in Beijing. Measures designed to reduce friction can simultaneously reduce the perceived costs of aggression. If military support, security commitments, or arms sales become negotiable elements in a broader diplomatic bargain, Beijing may conclude that the price of altering the status quo is lower than previously assumed.
The risk is not that the US deliberately invites conflict. The risk is that policies intended to avoid conflict gradually weaken deterrence.
Effective deterrence depends on convincing an adversary that the costs of aggression will remain prohibitively high. Ambiguity about that commitment can have the opposite effect, encouraging the very behavior policymakers seek to prevent.
The contradiction is particularly striking given Washington's long-standing message to its allies and partners. For years, US officials have urged countries facing security threats to invest more heavily in their own defense.
History shows
Taiwan responded by allocating significant resources toward asymmetric capabilities, including advanced air-defense systems and other tools designed to raise the cost of invasion. Yet some of those purchases now appear caught in a broader geopolitical calculation.
None of this suggests that diplomacy with Beijing is undesirable. Dialogue, crisis management, and efforts to reduce miscalculation are all essential.
However, diplomacy and deterrence are not substitutes for one another. They are complementary. History repeatedly demonstrates that negotiations are most effective when backed by credible strength, not when strength itself becomes a bargaining chip.
The danger of the current approach lies in its underlying logic. If de-escalation gestures become synonymous with reducing visible support for Taiwan, Washington may unintentionally weaken the very deterrent that has helped preserve peace for decades.
Strategic ambiguity has long been a feature of US policy. Strategic uncertainty about US resolve is something very different.
The objective of de-escalation should be to reduce the risk of war without altering Beijing's assessment of the costs of aggression. If policies intended to preserve stability instead convince Chinese leaders that those costs are becoming less prohibitive, the result will not be a more secure status quo. It will be a more fragile one.
John Cheng is a retired businessman from Hong Kong now living in Taiwan, and author of “Taiwan is Taiwan.”
