Taiwan should no longer sit at the margins of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue. It is already at the center of what the grouping claims to defend: a free and open Indo-Pacific.
Quad — comprising the US, Japan, Australia and India — reaffirmed its strategic alignment during a May 26 foreign ministers’ meeting in New Delhi. The gathering came at a moment of uncertainty, with concerns over US policy consistency under US President Donald Trump, friction in US-India relations and renewed diplomatic outreach to Beijing.
Yet the message from Washington was clear. US Secretary of State Marco Rubio described the Quad as a “linchpin” of US global strategy and called for it to become a “forum of action.”
That shift from rhetoric to execution is visible in a slate of new initiatives spanning maritime security, supply chains and energy resilience. But Quad’s credibility will ultimately be measured by how directly it addresses the region’s most sensitive flashpoint, which is Taiwan.
Taiwan was not explicitly on the ministers’ agenda. Still, the joint statement’s language left little ambiguity.
Quad expressed concern over coercive and destabilizing actions in the East and South China Seas, reaffirmed opposition to unilateral changes to the status quo and highlighted unsafe maritime and aerial maneuvers. These formulations, while diplomatic, point squarely at rising tensions around Taiwan.
Bloc chain
The implication is clear. Taiwan’s security is inseparable from Quad’s broader objective of maintaining regional stability. Any disruption in the Taiwan Strait would reverberate across global trade, particularly in semiconductors, and undermine the very principles Quad seeks to uphold.
It should consider making Taiwan’s safety and security a pillar of its regional strategy in the Indo-Pacific. After all, Taiwan’s global leadership in semiconductor supply chains and its commitment to freedom and equality are central to Quad’s objective of promoting a free and open Indo-Pacific.
Beijing’s reaction — dismissing Quad as an exclusive bloc fostering confrontation — underscores this reality. China’s criticism reflects not just opposition, but a recognition that Taiwan is gaining implicit backing from a widening network of democracies.
Quad’s evolving agenda reinforces that trajectory. Maritime security has emerged as a central pillar, with new initiatives such as the expansion of the Indo-Pacific Partnership for Maritime Domain Awareness, the launch of the Indo-Pacific Maritime Surveillance Collaboration and the first joint “Quad-at-sea” observer mission. Together, these efforts aim to improve real-time monitoring, interoperability and responses to coercive behavior across regional waters.
Economic security has also moved to the forefront. Quad’s critical minerals initiative — backed by a planned US$20 billion in public and private investment — seeks to reduce dependence on China’s dominance in rare earth supply chains. At the same time, an Indo-Pacific energy security framework aims to buffer the region from shocks, including those linked to instability in key chokepoints such as the Strait of Hormuz and the Red Sea.
‘Forum of action’
Infrastructure development rounds out the strategy. Plans to expand port capacity in Fiji build on earlier initiatives and offer an alternative to China’s financing model, which critics have described as debt-driven and strategically motivated.
Taken together, these measures mark a shift toward a more operational and economically grounded Quad. Yet they stop short of explicitly integrating Taiwan into the grouping’s strategic framework.
That omission is increasingly difficult to justify. Taiwan is not only a geopolitical flashpoint but also a cornerstone of global technology supply chains and a functioning democracy aligned with the Quad’s stated values. Treating its security as implicit rather than explicit risks weakening deterrence at a time when clarity matters most.
If Quad is to evolve into the “forum of action” its members envision, it should move beyond carefully worded statements. Making Taiwan’s peace and stability a defined pillar of its Indo-Pacific strategy would align its policies with its principles — and send a clearer signal about the order it seeks to defend.
Quad’s future direction may hinge on upcoming leadership-level engagement. But its strategic test is already evident. A free and open Indo-Pacific cannot be sustained without addressing Taiwan directly.
Sumit Kumar is a Ministry of Foreign Affairs visiting fellow at National Chengchi University, and assistant professor at the University of Delhi, Department of Political Science
