China’s expanding infiltration of Taiwan’s military, political, and business sectors is exposing weaknesses in the island’s counterintelligence defenses.

Amid rising Chinese espionage across industrial, military, and political domains, Taiwan faces a threat that cuts deep into its institutions. The trend demands urgent attention, as it directly undermines Taiwan’s efforts to strengthen defense preparedness and resilience.

As part of China’s grey zone strategy, infiltration gives the PRC direct access to sensitive government and defense information, while also allowing it to shape narratives through compliant individuals.

As espionage expands, the gap between Taiwan’s counterintelligence measures and China’s operational reach is widening. Taiwan must adapt to respond to this growing national security threat.

Several steps have already been taken. The Anti-Infiltration Act was promulgated in 2020, and President Lai Ching-te (賴清德) has pledged to strengthen efforts to counter PRC espionage.

Even so, more comprehensive and urgent measures are needed to prevent these efforts from being undermined.

Chinese infiltration can be understood across three layers, depending on how deeply it penetrates Taiwan’s decision-making structures.

At the surface level, China relies on cyber operations and disinformation without direct contact with officials or military personnel. According to Taiwan’s National Security Bureau, Chinese cyberattacks averaged 2.63 million intrusion attempts per day in 2025. These operations target government systems, critical infrastructure, and information networks to disrupt operations and gather intelligence.

At the intermediate level, China uses people-to-people networks, business ties, and media channels to exert influence. It applies pressure through tax inspections and financial penalties on Taiwanese businesses, illicit political donations routed through cross-strait commercial links, and civic and religious organizations.

Groups such as the Concentric Patriotism Alliance, as well as the Chinese Unification Promotion Party — whose members have been jailed for recruiting active and retired military personnel — show how civilian networks can serve as intelligence platforms. Business figures acting on behalf of Chinese intelligence agencies often link this layer to deeper operations.

At the deepest level, China embeds human intelligence within the military, critical infrastructure, and political institutions. This enables the collection of sensitive information across Taiwan’s political and defense sectors.

The semiconductor industry is also a target, with China seeking to acquire proprietary technologies to advance its own capabilities while weakening Taiwan’s dominance.

The military dimension is particularly concerning. According to former Defense Minister Chiu Kuo-cheng (邱國正), one in three individuals caught passing classified information to China did so while still in active service, pointing to vulnerabilities within Taiwan’s defense system.

These risks extend to political leadership, with cases indicating infiltration reaching as far as the presidential office.

These three layers reinforce one another and form part of China’s broader hybrid strategy to undermine stability, erode institutional trust, and weaken Taiwan’s ability to respond. With an estimated 5,000 spies operating in the country, the scale of the challenge is significant.

Taiwan has amended several laws to address this threat. The National Security Act was revised in 2022 to strengthen protections for critical technologies, and additional amendments have been proposed to address the problem of pro-invasion rhetoric against the country.

The Act Governing Relations between the People of the Taiwan Area and the Mainland Area has also been reviewed, particularly regarding travel restrictions for officials with access to sensitive information.

However, legislation alone is not enough. Each layer of infiltration requires a targeted response.

At the surface level, Taiwan should continue strengthening cyber resilience by improving incident response, securing critical infrastructure, and publicly attributing Chinese cyber operations. Naming and exposing such activity remains an important tool.

At the intermediate level, enforcement of existing laws needs to be strengthened. Penalties under the Anti-Infiltration Act remain limited, and when punishments do not reflect the severity of the offense, deterrence weakens. Stronger sentencing would send a clearer signal.

Defense Minister Wellington Koo (顧立雄) has also called for tougher penalties for individuals who threaten national security.

Public awareness is equally important. Civic education efforts, as highlighted by President Lai, can help reduce China’s influence by strengthening resilience against disinformation.

Taiwan must also address the channels through which infiltration occurs, including civic organizations, online platforms, and weaknesses within the armed forces such as personnel screening and information security.

In March 2025, President Lai introduced 17 measures addressing five major national security threats linked to China’s united front tactics. These include closer monitoring of cross-strait exchanges, stricter penalties for expressions of loyalty to hostile actors, and increased transparency regarding officials’ interactions with China.

Some proposals, such as reinstating military courts, have been controversial. The measures aim to strengthen deterrence, but their scope has raised concerns about potential impacts on freedom of speech.

Countering infiltration raises difficult questions about how to balance national security with civil liberties. Religious groups, for example, are particularly vulnerable given Taiwan’s strong protections for religious freedom, and Beijing has sought to exploit this by funding temples and promoting pro-CCP narratives.

Despite these challenges, Lai’s initiatives represent a long-overdue recognition of the scale of China’s infiltration.

However, no single measure will be sufficient. China’s efforts are coordinated across multiple layers, and Taiwan’s response must be equally coherent.

Without a unified institutional approach, existing gaps will persist, allowing Beijing to continue exploiting them. Political polarization in Taiwan further complicates this, creating openings for external interference.

Ultimately, beyond laws and deterrence, Taiwan’s response depends on a shared political commitment to place national security above partisan interests.