Kuomintang leader Cheng Li-wun’s (鄭麗文) visit to China was another reminder that Beijing would not need to subdue Taiwan by force if it could instead work successfully through collaborators inside the country.

Given the long history of engagement between the KMT and the Chinese Communist Party, Cheng’s meeting with Xi could have been treated as routine. However, the visit assumed significance not simply because of what Xi and Cheng tried to signal, but because of what it revealed about how Taiwan should respond to the KMT’s China policy if it wants to protect its sovereignty.

Xi sought to use the visit to reinforce Beijing’s claim that people on both sides of the Taiwan Strait share historical, social, cultural, and ancestral ties. Yet Taiwan’s history is more complex than that narrative suggests. Its Indigenous peoples have lived on the island for thousands of years, and Taiwan’s identity cannot be reduced to Beijing’s political framing.

For that reason, it is troubling that a KMT leader would echo rhetoric that serves China’s objective of subsuming Taiwan into its own national story.

The history of the Chinese Communist Party has been marked by violence, repression, and mass suffering. Land reform campaigns, the Great Leap Forward, the Cultural Revolution, the Tiananmen Square massacre, and the persecution of minorities and spiritual groups caused immense human tragedy. Beijing’s treatment of Tibet and Hong Kong further shows that the party’s promises of restraint and coexistence cannot be taken at face value.

Against that background, expecting China to soften its policy toward Taiwan is unrealistic. If anything, a KMT return to power could create more room for Beijing to erode Taiwan’s democratic system from within. There is little evidence that the Chinese Communist Party sees peace and coexistence with Taiwan as an end in itself. China’s refusal to engage with Taiwan’s ruling party raises serious doubts about its claimed commitment to resolving cross-strait tensions peacefully.

As US Senator Jeanne Shaheen said during a recent visit to Taiwan, “talking is good,” but Beijing should be engaging with Taiwan’s elected leaders, not just the opposition.

China’s 10 new policy measures should also be treated as a warning for Taiwan for at least two reasons. First, the announcement was made at the party level between the CCP and the KMT, undermining the authority of Taiwan’s elected government. Second, under the banner of market access for Taiwanese fishery and agricultural products and expanded air connectivity, Beijing is trying to deepen Taiwan’s economic dependence.

At the same time, Xi’s government sees Taiwan as useful in helping China manage its own economic difficulties. China’s latest move is therefore not about benefiting Taiwan, but about protecting its own interests in a turbulent international environment. The rest of the world should keep that in mind before accepting Beijing’s gesture as sympathetic or constructive.

Many Taiwanese and analysts are right to argue that Cheng’s visit was another effort to create confusion over Taiwan’s status by framing it as part of China’s domestic affairs. Even within the KMT, some have expressed concern that the trip undermined Taiwan’s sovereignty and made the party appear to be playing into Beijing’s hands.

The KMT’s renewed overtures toward China could backfire in the 2026 local elections and the 2028 presidential election, especially if younger voters continue to reject candidates seen as too close to Beijing.

At the same time, the KMT’s opposition to the Lai administration’s roughly NT$1.28 trillion (US$40 billion) defense budget for arms purchases from the United States to modernize Taiwan’s military makes Cheng’s visit even more concerning. It underscores the need for Taiwan to take stronger steps to protect its security and independence.

In this effort, the United States remains Taiwan’s most important security partner. The Taiwan Relations Act of 1979 commits the US to provide Taiwan with arms of a defensive character and to maintain the capacity to resist force or coercion that would jeopardize the security or social and economic system of the people of Taiwan.

Cheng’s remarks during the trip, however, risk portraying Washington as a source of danger rather than a deterrent against China. The visit may also deepen divisions between the DPP and the KMT on vital national questions, increasing Taiwan’s domestic vulnerability at a time of growing external pressure.

With Cheng’s visit triggering renewed debate about Taiwan’s security at home and abroad, it is essential that Taiwan not fall prey to China’s strategic, economic, or misinformation tactics. Taipei should continue strengthening its asymmetric military capabilities, reducing economic dependence, enhancing cybersecurity, and carefully vetting foreign investment.

Taiwan must also preserve political unity on the most fundamental question facing the country: how to defend its democracy and sovereignty against growing pressure from Beijing. If Taiwan’s political divisions are exploited by China, the damage will not be limited to party competition, but could weaken the country’s ability to respond to external coercion.

For that reason, Cheng’s visit was not about peace. It was Beijing using the KMT to advance its agenda and erode Taiwan from within.

Sumit Kumar is a Ministry of Foreign Affairs visiting fellow at National Chengchi University in Taipei and an assistant professor in the Department of Political Science at the University of Delhi.