The military conflict involving Iran and the US-Israel alliance has escalated sharply following the killing of Iran’s supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, along with several senior political and military figures during joint US-Israel strikes across Iran on Feb. 28.

As the situation evolves, countries around the world are reacting cautiously to the deteriorating security environment in the Middle East. A key concern is whether the confrontation between Iran and the US-Israel alliance will prolong, or whether President Donald Trump and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu will succeed in achieving their core objectives through the operation.

Those objectives include regime change in Iran and the elimination of its nuclear and missile capabilities. Either outcome could significantly reshape both regional dynamics and the broader global order.

One country that has criticized the US-Israel military action is China. A spokesperson for China’s Foreign Ministry said on X that “Iran’s sovereignty, security and territorial integrity should be respected.”

The statement also called for “an immediate stop of the military actions, no further escalation of the tense situation, resumption of dialogue and negotiation, and efforts to uphold peace and stability in the Middle East.”

By adopting a pro-Iran stance, the Xi Jinping regime appears to be seeking continuity of the current government in Tehran in order to safeguard its own strategic interests.

First, relations between China and Iran have strengthened over time, particularly as US sanctions pushed Tehran closer to Beijing. The current conflict with the US could further deepen Iran’s dependence on China for economic and security support.

Second, China views Iran as an important strategic partner in counterbalancing US influence in the Middle East. From Beijing’s perspective, it is therefore undesirable for Iran to fall under US influence.

Over the years, China has invested in developing Iran’s critical infrastructure, including telecommunications networks, surveillance systems, and satellite technologies.

Third, Beijing is concerned that a US-Israeli victory in Iran could affect China’s Belt and Road Initiative. Iran’s geographic position makes it a key gateway connecting China to Turkey and the European Union through Central Asia.

Fourth, Iran is also a significant energy supplier to China. In 2025, Iranian oil accounted for 13.5% of the oil China imported by sea, often at discounted prices.

China also imports large volumes of energy from other Middle Eastern countries. As a result, any disruption to the Strait of Hormuz — the primary maritime route linking the Persian Gulf with global markets — could have major implications for China’s manufacturing sector.

Taken together, these factors help explain Beijing’s diplomatic support for Iran.

At the same time, some analysts argue that China is unlikely to face an immediate energy crisis because of the conflict. Others believe that managing trade tensions with the US remains a higher priority for Beijing than openly backing Tehran.

China may also calculate that complete regime change in Iran is unlikely, allowing Beijing to retain influence in any post-war political environment.

Another view is that China recognizes the strategic advantage of the US becoming deeply engaged in the Middle East. A prolonged conflict could impose significant financial and military costs on Washington while diverting its attention away from the Indo-Pacific.

Whatever Beijing’s calculations may be, the current conflict has once again highlighted China’s limited willingness and capability to directly challenge US military power.

This reality may weaken China’s ambition to promote an alternative global order that challenges liberal democratic values and institutions. Countries that increasingly look to Beijing for strategic partnership may need to reconsider whether China can truly serve as a reliable security partner.

Conversely, the Trump administration’s actions in Iran demonstrate the United States’ capacity to conduct precise military operations and its willingness to use force to defend its interests.

From this perspective, Washington’s reputation as a reliable ally and strategic partner has been affirmed.

Developments in Iran could also have implications for the Taiwan Strait and the broader Indo-Pacific region.

Chinese leaders may conclude that any attempt to use force against Taiwan would provoke a strong and potentially unexpected military response from the United States.

This calculation could partly explain the recent reduction in Chinese military aircraft flights and drone operations around Taiwan in February, as Beijing seeks to ensure a stable environment ahead of a potential meeting between Donald Trump and Xi Jinping in late March.

While it is in the interest of the international community that the conflict in Iran ends quickly, the US-led military operation has demonstrated Washington’s readiness to act decisively against states it views as challenging the foundations of a free and open international order.

For this reason, Taiwan’s continued de facto independence should be recognized as a core national interest of the United States. Without Taiwan’s democratic system and economic vitality, the global order would look very different.

Sumit Kumar is a Ministry of Foreign Affairs visiting fellow at National Chengchi University in Taipei and an assistant professor in the Department of Political Science at the University of Delhi.