The outbreak of war in Iran highlights the critical importance of air-defense systems, as the country’s leadership was decapitated during the initial strikes and its ability to coordinate defense fractured within hours.
Equally significant, the conflict underscores the asymmetric power of drones. Iran struck targets across the Gulf with its drone arsenal, hitting Bahrain, Kuwait, and Dubai, while Israel’s Iron Dome continued to demonstrate the value of layered defensive architecture — though not without limitations.
Taiwan must learn from this war and accelerate the adoption of drone and anti-drone systems. The key question is whether Taiwan is building fast enough — and whether it is building the right capabilities.
Taiwan has attempted to close its drone capability gap in recent years. The effort began under former President Tsai Ing-wen (蔡英文), who launched the “Drone National Team” initiative in 2022. The push has continued under President Lai Ching-te (賴清德), whose administration has set a goal of producing 180,000 drone units annually by 2028.
In late 2025, the Cabinet approved a comprehensive plan to develop Taiwan’s domestic drone industry, pledging NT$44.2 billion (US$1.43 billion) in funding through 2030 and setting a procurement target of 100,000 drones by that timeline. Compared with the 3,422 drones procured by 2024, these figures represent a significant increase.
Even so, these numbers remain small relative to the demands of drone-intensive warfare. In Ukraine, for example, about 2.2 million unmanned aerial vehicles of various types were produced in 2024, with production expected to exceed 4.5 million in 2025.
Different theaters of war certainly present different conditions, but those figures illustrate the scale at which drones are consumed in modern conflict. Taiwan’s planned inventory of 100,000 drones could potentially be depleted within days in a high-intensity scenario.
China’s own drone industry further amplifies this concern. In 2024 alone, nearly 2.2 million drones were registered with China’s Civil Aviation Administration, up from 1.26 million in 2023. Although these figures reflect civilian use, they suggest an industrial base capable of rapid conversion to military production at a scale Taiwan cannot currently match.
Taiwan, despite its growing efforts, remains underprepared for drone-intensive warfare and must urgently strengthen its asymmetric capabilities.
The war in Iran offers several lessons on how Taiwan should prepare for a potential invasion.
The right direction at the wrong pace
Taiwan’s drone procurement strategy currently rests on three tiers: larger military drones purchased from the United States, mid-sized systems developed by state-owned enterprises, and smaller dual-use drones produced by the private sector.
Drones are also part of Taiwan’s Five Trusted Industry Sectors initiative, which aims to build a resilient supply chain. In addition, a comprehensive drone industry development program for 2025–2030 was launched in late 2025 to position Taiwan as a democratic hub for a “non-red” drone supply chain through four strategic initiatives.
Militarily, drone applications are organized around a three-layer operational approach — joint operations, tactical use, and combat roles — designed to enhance long-range reconnaissance, degrade enemy air-defense systems, and shorten response times.
At the same time, Taiwan has accelerated development of uncrewed surface vessels and uncrewed underwater vehicles, extending its asymmetric capabilities beyond the air domain.
Yet the gap between the requirements of asymmetric warfare and current investment priorities raises serious questions about Taiwan’s readiness for a potential invasion.
Recent analyses suggest Taiwan should prioritize the “porcupine strategy” over large and expensive weapons systems, creating a “hellscape” that would make an invasion prohibitively costly for China.
Such a strategy would require Taiwan to swarm People’s Liberation Army forces with drones as they cross the Taiwan Strait and during potential landings on the main island, slowing or halting the invasion.
However, this approach would require Taiwan to drastically increase both the acquisition and production of uncrewed systems — a task complicated by international isolation, political deadlock, and supply chains dominated by China.
This supply-chain challenge is particularly difficult because sourcing alternative components is costly for both government contractors and private companies.
China has also invested heavily in anti-drone systems, while Taiwan remains behind in this field and often relies on surface-to-air missiles that cost far more than the drones they intercept — raising the risk that Taiwan’s stockpiles could be depleted quickly during sustained attacks.
Projects are underway to improve Taiwan’s capabilities, including portable anti-drone systems and jamming technologies developed by Tron Future, Taiwan’s first provider of anti-drone defense systems.
Taiwan’s drone ecosystem also lacks access to battlefield data shared among allied forces and has limited operational experience, compounding the capability gaps described above.
If the war in Iran highlights the central role drones could play in Taiwan’s asymmetric strategy, it also raises questions about the proposed T-Dome system.
Can the T-Dome survive missile saturation?
Announced on Oct. 10, 2025, by President Lai, the T-Dome is designed to adapt Israel’s Iron Dome concept to Taiwan’s security environment.
The integrated air-and-missile defense system would protect Taiwan against People’s Liberation Army aircraft, ballistic and cruise missiles, and drones by intercepting threats at multiple ranges and altitudes while using artificial intelligence to enhance detection and decision-making.
The T-Dome aims to address weaknesses in Taiwan’s air-defense architecture, including fragmentation, high interception costs, and limited mobility.
However, questions remain about how the system aligns with Taiwan’s asymmetric strategy and the capabilities of its adversary. Unlike Israel’s Iron Dome — which primarily confronts rocket barrages and whose interception rate decreased against Iranian strikes — Taiwan would face a mix of ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and drone swarms. Even a highly capable system could be overwhelmed by the scale of China’s arsenal.
During Iran’s retaliatory strikes, the United Arab Emirates intercepted 541 drones, yet 35 still landed inside the country and caused material damage, illustrating how even well-funded air defenses can struggle under saturation attacks.
Operating such an integrated system would also require extensive infrastructure and testing, while Taiwan already faces time pressure to strengthen its defenses.
Compounding this challenge, the proposed NT$1.25 trillion special defense budget intended to fund the T-Dome remains stalled amid political polarization, delaying implementation and raising the risk that the system could arrive too late.
While Taiwan must address weaknesses in its air-defense architecture to protect critical infrastructure, cost-effective deterrence measures should remain a central priority.
The risk of political decapitation
The Iran war provides another lesson Taiwan cannot afford to ignore. Within hours of the opening strikes on Feb. 28, Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei was killed at his workplace along with senior security officials, before Iran could meaningfully organize a response.
Taiwan’s government should study that sequence carefully. A Chinese operation across the Taiwan Strait would likely begin with a preparatory strike phase targeting radar installations, air-defense batteries, and communications infrastructure to degrade Taiwan’s military capacity before any amphibious landing begins.
Alongside these conventional targets, political leadership could also become a priority. China has conducted exercises replicating Taiwan’s government buildings, suggesting the Presidential Office and other leadership facilities have been closely studied.
Taiwan also faces serious Chinese intelligence penetration, which could facilitate such operations.
Initial strikes might therefore aim to disrupt political decision-making capacity. A government unable to issue coherent orders or coordinate defense in the opening hours of a conflict would concede a significant strategic advantage before the fighting fully begins.
At the same time, a decapitation strike not followed by a successful invasion could backfire for Beijing by strengthening Taiwanese resistance and drawing international support for Taiwan.
Beijing is probably closely monitoring how Israel and the United States will attempt to force a favorable regime change in Iran.
The window is narrow
Unlike Ukraine, Taiwan still has time to close the gap between the capabilities it has today and what it may need in a future conflict — but that window is narrowing.
What Taiwan requires is a clearer roadmap defining which capabilities must be developed and on what timeline.
This will require abandoning outdated military doctrines and fully embracing the elements that could make Taiwan unconquerable — resilient asymmetric warfare and the strategic advantages provided by its geography. Drones will play a central role in that approach.
Taiwan also has an opportunity to leverage the diplomatic dimension of drone development. In September 2024, Taiwan launched the Taiwan Excellence Drone Industry Business Opportunities Alliance (TEDIBOA), bringing together more than 200 drone and component companies to accelerate development, expand global cooperation, and build a “non-red” supply chain.
The initiative has already resulted in eight memorandums of understanding with partner countries, including the United States and Japan.
Growing drone exports could also strengthen Taiwan’s international integration and security partnerships.
The foundation is in place; what is required now is speed. Taiwan must dramatically expand domestic drone production to align with the security challenges it faces.
Achieving this will require strengthening the drone industry and securing reliable supply chains so Taiwan can independently manufacture the systems needed to deter China and respond effectively to a potential invasion.
Taiwan must also invest urgently in cost-effective anti-drone systems rather than relying primarily on expensive surface-to-air missiles. Domestic firms such as Tron Future and Hutron provide a credible base for rapid deployment across critical infrastructure and outlying islands.
Training must also keep pace with procurement. Recent developments are encouraging: the Army’s Drone Training Center held its first on-site drone licensing examination in February 2026, while the 58th Artillery Command conducted immersive UAV training using first-person-view goggles to improve navigation, spatial awareness, and precision control in complex environments.
Finally, Taiwan should deepen knowledge-sharing with Ukraine on drone tactics, electronic countermeasures, and lessons from sustained drone-intensive conflict.
Although Ukraine’s drone industry still depends heavily on Chinese components, recent memorandums of understanding between TEDIBOA and Iron Cluster — a Ukrainian technology hub — and between Taiwan’s Defense Industry Development Association and its Ukrainian counterpart suggest that diplomatic barriers to cooperation could gradually erode.
The war in Iran has demonstrated in real time what drone saturation and political decapitation can look like when a country is caught unprepared. Taiwan has an opportunity to learn from that example without having to experience it firsthand.
