Ahead of the forthcoming meeting between US President Donald Trump and Chinese leader Xi Jinping, arms sales to Taiwan have again become the paramount issue between Beijing and Washington. In this context, Trump has raised concerns regarding his commitment toward Taiwan by creating a dangerous precedent and consulting with Xi on this issue.
Indeed, reports from The Washington Post affirm that a US arms sales package is in limbo following pressure from China. Although a White House official promptly reaffirmed US policy toward Taiwan, such verbal reassurances may be insufficient when the precedent has already been set.
The damage lies in the fact that Beijing has a say in matters of arms sales to Taiwan. This carries profound implications for the Six Assurances to Taiwan –– a guideline set in 1982 in conducting US–Taiwan relations. The second point states that the “United States would not consult with China in advance before making decisions about US arms sales to Taiwan.”
By making arms sales to Taipei a subject of US-China dialogue, Washington has effectively granted Beijing standing to have a voice in the matter. This is precisely what the Assurances were designed to exclude.
It would be naive to believe that arms sales have never been discussed during previous administrations’ dialogues with China, but this has never been presented in such a theatrical way. While delaying an arms package before an important diplomatic meeting is, in isolation, basic statecraft, the true concern is different: once China believes that arms sales are a negotiable variable, it will push further.
Whether this pressure manifests as delays, modifications to package contents, or limits on specific capabilities, the consequences for Taiwan's defense readiness could be severe. Notably, pushing for the exclusion of High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS) could be one of China’s objectives. If Beijing feels that arms sales can be part of a deal, there is little doubt that they will continue to push for it.
Arms sales as lever
This alignment between Washington and Beijing also raises pressing questions regarding the Taiwan Relations Act. How does Trump’s administration intend to comply with its legal obligation to provide Taiwan with defensive arms? How does it evaluate Taiwan's defense needs when those needs are being weighed against diplomatic considerations with the very power that threatens the nation?
And yet, a degree of nuance is necessary. In December 2025, the US signed the largest ever arms package to Taiwan, worth approximately NT$350 billion (US$11 billion). During its first and more recent second administration, Trump has meaningfully supported Taiwan.
One could say that US-Taiwan relations are probably at their highest level ever. Defense-wise, both nations have grown their partnership through drones, planned co-production of ammunition, future joint maritime operations and training.
Economically, the two parties recently signed a tariff deal, the Agreement on Reciprocal Trade, and Taiwan, as a semiconductor powerhouse and member of the Pax Silica, is a cornerstone for the US AI strategy.
Nothing in the current situation suggests that Trump is prepared to be the president who abandoned Taiwan. His administration has, in all likelihood, been using the prospect of arms sales as a lever — increasing and decreasing pressure on Beijing at will, as part of a broader transactional strategy.
Moreover, Trump's record suggests a preference for maintaining the long-standing US strategic ambiguity, which requires building deterrence through enhancing Taiwan’s defense capabilities.
Nonetheless, the April meeting between Xi and Trump carries real risks as Taiwan could be used as a bargaining chip. In parallel, the narrative surrounding Taiwan is already shifting in Washington, moving toward framing Taiwan as a liability rather than an asset for the US national security.
Dual clarity
Taiwan is well-conscious of these risks and has displayed considerable efforts to placate US demands. Yet its agency in this dynamic remains limited and its capacity to act is hindered by internal division.
In such a context, several responses are necessary. There is a need to elevate the Six Assurances to law, converting a policy guideline into a statutory obligation that no administration can quietly circumvent through diplomatic back-channels.
Equally important, strategic dual ambiguity has lost much of its deterrent power and is increasingly playing in Beijing's favor, as Washington appears unable to properly deter China through ambiguity alone. Dual clarity — an approach in which Washington would respond to any Chinese use of force against Taiwan, while reaffirming its opposition to unilateral moves toward Taiwan independence — deserves serious consideration as an updated framework.
It is also critical for Washington to back its allies who lean toward this approach. Japan's signals on Taiwan's strategic importance should have received greater support from the US rather than being met with relative silence.
The Six Assurances were a deliberate commitment, made to reassure Taipei that the framework governing the US-Taiwan relations would not be quietly renegotiated in bilateral talks with Beijing. That commitment is now under pressure — not through a single dramatic reversal, but through the slow erosion of precedent.
For the US, its credibility as a reliable partner is at stake. In the past year, the Trump administration has shown little regard for historical alliances and the frameworks that underpin them.
Washington’s role in the strait is to ensure that the dialogue between Taipei and Beijing remains free from coercion in order to provide a peaceful resolution to the issue. This notably passes through supporting Taiwan’s defensive capabilities.
What Taiwan must now hope for is that the April meeting will not result in a more destabilized status quo.
