A Kuomintang delegation’s recent visit to Beijing shows how cross-strait exchanges can be used to advance the Chinese Communist Party’s political claims at Taiwan’s expense.
On Feb. 2, Kuomintang Deputy Chair Hsiao Hsu-tsen (蕭旭岑) led a party delegation to Beijing for a think tank exchange with the Chinese Communist Party.
The trip was framed as an effort to promote cross-strait peace and industrial exchanges. Yet its messaging quickly aligned with Beijing’s preferred narrative.
Hsiao advocated “national rejuvenation” on both sides of the Taiwan Strait and stressed that both belong to the Chinese nation. That framing contradicts how most Taiwanese view their identity, and it risks weakening Taiwan’s international standing and political coherence.
The KMT’s willingness to echo pro-China rhetoric should serve as a warning to those who do not see unification as Taiwan’s future — which appears to include a majority of Taiwanese.
Toward renewed bonds between the KMT and the CCP
Since former President Tsai Ing-wen took office in 2016, cross-strait relations have grown steadily more tense, with Beijing adopting a more coercive posture year after year.
After three consecutive Democratic Progressive Party administrations, one of the clearest trends in Taiwan’s sociopolitical landscape is that unification holds little appeal for most Taiwanese.
Despite this reality, the KMT’s recent internal politics have featured stronger “mainlander” sentiment. KMT Chair Cheng Li-wun (鄭麗文) called for Taiwanese to be proud of being Chinese, and she has since reiterated that Taiwan and mainland China are “a family.”
That framing challenges the self-determination principles that underpin Taiwan’s democratic identity and its international standing.
At the same time, the KMT has argued that Taiwan should “rebalance” its relationship with the United States and avoid choosing a side between two great powers. This approach resembles former President Ma Ying-jeou’s (馬英九) strategy during his two terms.
In that context, this visit appears to have also served a political purpose: paving the way for Cheng’s intended trip to Beijing, where she reportedly plans to meet Chinese leader Xi Jinping, before a subsequent trip to the United States.
There is little doubt such exchanges serve Beijing’s broader strategy. They normalize a reunification narrative, complicate the current government’s efforts to strengthen defense, and risk undermining Taipei’s credibility with partners abroad.
Notably, the visit was soon followed by a call between US President Donald Trump and Xi, in which Taiwan and weapons deliveries were reportedly discussed ahead of a planned meeting in April.
A weaker and more internally divided Taiwan could be treated as a bargaining chip if Beijing can satisfy Trump’s transactional priorities.
It is also important to acknowledge a political reality in Taiwan: the KMT is the only major party with which the CCP is willing to engage meaningfully. That underscores the KMT’s potential influence on cross-strait dynamics.
What remains critical is how willing the KMT is to defend what Taiwanese prefer in such forums.
In a context where political deadlock constrains government action, the party’s appetite for engagement — despite continuous military threats around Taiwan — signals it may be prepared to downplay or overlook coercive actions if engagement serves political objectives.
That raises questions that extend well beyond domestic politics.
The stakes for Taiwan credibility and stability
Preserving cross-strait dialogue can help reduce miscalculation and promote peace. But the KMT’s recent actions also suggest a worrying pattern: denial of social and security realities within Taiwan.
Disregarding Taiwanese preferences, China’s coercive measures, and national security imperatives may enable exchanges and short-term political gains. It does not serve Taiwan’s long-term interests.
National division undermines international perceptions of Taiwan as a stable partner. It can also reinforce Beijing’s ability to pressure countries that engage with Taiwan and to advance its gray-zone tactics.
It further complicates the perception that Taiwan is willing to defend itself — an image already questioned in the United States.
Endless debates over defense spending have eroded credibility. Looking ahead, the 2027 elections risk further exposing to the international community how fragmented Taiwan’s political landscape has become — a situation readily exploitable by those seeking to undermine the country.
The KMT is not the sole source of the problem. But its actions raise urgent questions about how much weight Taiwanese public preference and security imperatives carry in shaping its cross-strait policy.
More broadly, Taiwan must test whether this kind of engagement with China ultimately serves Taiwan’s interests, or advances a narrow political agenda at the expense of international standing and long-term security.
As external pressure intensifies and domestic gridlock persists, Taiwan’s credibility will hinge on political coherence and on whether major parties can prioritize national interests over party advantage. That, more than rhetoric, will shape whether Taiwan is seen abroad as a stable, self-determining democracy worth supporting.
