Taiwan and Italy have deepened ties since Giorgia Meloni became prime minister in 2022.

Propelled by Italy’s pragmatic engagement with China, the European Union’s de-risking approach toward the People’s Republic of China, and a wider recognition that the Asia-Pacific — and Taiwan — are central to Europe’s security, Rome–Taipei cooperation has expanded.

Over the past 12 months, official engagements have multiplied — three Italian delegations visited Taiwan, including the largest ever in early January 2026, with lawmakers from six parties. That bipartisan showing signals durable support in Rome.

This partnership promises mutual gains: Taiwan can bolster Italy’s technological development and growth, while Italy can become one of Taiwan’s most important political allies in Europe. As Taipei seeks to break out of isolation, Meloni’s government is a strategic partner.

Italy’s China policy has shifted. Rome recognized the PRC in 1970 and later joined the Belt and Road Initiative via a 2019 memorandum.

Since 2022, Meloni’s government has taken a more Atlantic, values-forward tack — withdrawing from the BRI in December 2023 — while keeping channels with Beijing open.

During Meloni’s July 2024 trip to Beijing, the two sides signed a 2024–2027 Action Plan for their Comprehensive Strategic Partnership focused on trade and infrastructure, steering clear of flashpoints. What has changed most is Italy’s approach to Taiwan.

Rome has emphasized Taiwan’s democratic values, the importance of the status quo, and concern over Chinese military activity in the Strait.

Italy’s “Buy Transatlantic” law — favoring technologies from Italy, EU and NATO states, and like-minded partners for information and communications technology and cybersecurity in critical infrastructure — can further align interests with Taipei.

Taiwan is pivotal for Europe’s technological sovereignty. Italy’s semiconductor ecosystem lacks advanced-node foundries and a strong fabless base, while Taiwan is a powerhouse in both, making it a natural ally.

Innovation is also central to Italy’s growth challenge. Taiwanese GlobalWafers’ new FAB300 300-mm wafer facility has been highlighted as a key enabler, and Taiwanese programs are training Italian talent for future homegrown innovation.

Beyond chips, Taiwan has become a growing market for Italian exports, with values doubling over the past decade. In an era when great powers weaponize supply chains, Taiwan’s reliability and democratic credentials strengthen its case as a partner.

Italian political support has become more explicit. In September 2024, the Chamber of Deputies’ Foreign Affairs Committee unanimously urged the government to back Taiwan’s participation in the United Nations system — as a member where statehood is not required, and as observer or guest where it is.

Rome has reiterated support at sensitive moments, from South Africa’s downgrade of Taiwan’s representation to rising PLA coercion. Educational partnerships, direct flights, and cultural initiatives are building people-to-people ties.

Taiwan’s diplomatic push in Europe — led by Foreign Minister Lin Chia-lung (林佳龍) and his team — deserves credit for keeping Taiwan salient among democracies. The groundwork for a deeper Italy–Taiwan relationship is in place. What’s needed now is steady engagement, political commitment, and mutual benefit.

Meloni has done what many thought unlikely: strengthen ties with Taiwan while maintaining economic relations with China.

Italy’s BRI withdrawal did not trigger severe backlash from Beijing, nor has Rome’s rapprochement with Taipei — a sign that closer alignment with Taiwan can be managed without rupturing ties with China if handled prudently.

As EU–Taiwan engagement grows, deeper ties with Europe’s third-largest economy would further anchor Taiwan in the region. Italy’s 2027 elections will matter: a renewed Meloni mandate would likely sustain this trajectory.

Pressure against European partners engaging Taiwan will continue — and intensify as Taiwan gains salience in EU debates. To resist coercion, Western coordination is essential.

Italy’s tendency to align its Asia-Pacific policy with Washington could benefit Taiwan if US backing remains strong. President Trump’s stance toward Taiwan and the PRC will shape Rome’s posture.

Bridge-builders such as the Italian Chamber of Commerce in Taipei also matter. Its president, Andrea Sing-ying Lee (李新穎) — once referred to by Meloni as “ambassador of Taiwan” — brings rare dual-market insight that can turn political goodwill into concrete projects.

The fit is clear: Italy benefits from Taiwan’s technological edge, while Taiwan needs stronger European footholds that Rome can provide. With sustained effort, the partnership has all the ingredients to succeed.

One tension, though, may require delicate diplomacy: after Taiwan won “best panettone” in 2025, Italy will be keen to reclaim the crown in 2026.