Taiwan’s democracy faces a constitutional crisis as impeachment threats, a paralyzed Constitutional Court, and a stalled NT$1.25 trillion (US$39.7 billion) defense budget converge amid deepening polarization.
Since Lai Ching-te (賴清德) took office, the executive and legislature have battled in a way that tests institutional limits. President Lai and Premier Cho Jung-tai (卓榮泰) now face impeachment threats after the Cabinet refused, for the first time in Taiwan’s history, to sign the Act Governing the Allocation of Government Revenues and Expenditures.
Meanwhile, the Constitutional Court has been functionally paralyzed and unable to resolve growing separation-of-powers disputes. Budget clashes persist, Taiwan’s NT$1.25 trillion special defense budget remains blocked for the second time, which could raise questions in Washington about Taiwan’s commitment to self-defense amid intensifying Chinese pressure.
Taiwan stands at a dangerous crossroads where institutional paralysis, opposition maneuvering, and external threats converge. The deadlock exposes vulnerabilities in Taiwan’s democratic architecture and risks undermining both internal stability and external resilience.
Since Lai’s election, political disagreements have hardened into a prolonged standoff. While contention is part of democracy, the opposition’s continuing push to assert its position has contributed to democratic backsliding.
A controversial amendment to the Constitutional Court Procedure Act passed by the Kuomintang–Taiwan People’s Party coalition one year ago imposed three constraints: a ten-justice quorum for constitutional adjudication, regardless of how many justices were seated; a supermajority of nine votes to invalidate legislation; and immediate effect upon promulgation, bypassing the usual three-day grace period.
Those rules, combined with seven justices’ terms expiring at the end of October 2024, made filling vacancies critical. The Legislative Yuan rejected all seven of President Lai’s nominees in December 2024 and again in July 2025, leaving the court with eight justices. Unable to meet the ten-justice quorum, the court has been effectively frozen.
The opposition has also used its legislative power to reshape the allocation of authority and resources. Through the Act Governing the Allocation of Government Revenues and Expenditures, the KMT–TPP coalition has sought to redirect resources from the DPP-controlled executive to KMT-controlled local governments. The Cabinet’s refusal to sign the act has, in turn, prompted the push for impeachment.
In the author’s view, by expanding legislative leverage, limiting the court’s operations, and systematically blocking the executive, the KMT and TPP have weakened Taiwan’s democracy, paralyzed one branch, and eroded national security.
These are not superficial differences. They reflect real divides over how to position Taiwan between China and the United States, how to balance cross-strait dialogue and deterrence, and how to reconcile identities — questions that touch national survival.
The Constitutional Court was designed to arbitrate institutional disputes, but disabling the arbiter leaves both sides pushing their constitutional prerogatives to the limit. The result is dysfunction.
Timing makes this particularly dangerous. China’s military pressure has intensified; rhetoric on “reunification” has hardened; drills around Taiwan have grown more aggressive. Taiwan’s security environment demands urgent defense development — precisely what deadlock blocks.
The stalled NT$1.25 trillion special defense budget shows how domestic paralysis becomes vulnerability. Each month of delay is a month lost to modernization; Beijing’s military timelines do not pause for Taiwan’s legislative fights.
International optics matter too. US security commitments ultimately rest on Taiwan demonstrating sustained political will to invest in defense. That reality will not change.
Beijing likely reads Taiwan’s paralysis as proof that patient pressure pays. If partisan warfare prevents unified decisions under an obvious threat, hybrid tactics look more rewarding, feeding a cycle: paralysis raises vulnerability, which sharpens disagreements over how to respond, which deepens paralysis.
Breaking the deadlock will require political compromise. Impeaching a president requires a two-thirds majority in the Legislative Yuan — a threshold the opposition does not command. A no-confidence vote against the premier would force a legislative dissolution and new elections, a risk the opposition may not want.
These realities should push both sides toward negotiation. Neither camp can win outright via constitutional procedure. The Cabinet’s response to impeachment — treating it as a constitutionally recognized path to resolve the dispute — helps avoid further escalation.
What is needed now is compromise for Taiwan’s sake. The opposition rightly checks executive power and demands accountability. The government holds constitutional authority to set policy. Both must ensure political goals do not weaken the state.
Separation of powers must be safeguarded to preserve functionality. The court’s paralysis is a cautionary tale. Confirming justices to restore capacity, respecting boundaries between oversight and execution, and treating institutions as foundations — not weapons — are necessary steps.
Taiwan has survived authoritarian rule, completed democratic alternation, and built a robust civil society. The current impasse is severe, but not insurmountable. Taiwan’s external threats are too serious, and its democratic gains too valuable, to sacrifice to indefinite political warfare. The question is whether leaders across parties will compromise soon enough to restore capacity — before the deadlock undermines Taiwan’s ability to defend itself.
