President Trump’s Dec. 2 signing of the Taiwan Assurance Implementation Act — his first pro-Taiwan law of the second term — was warmly welcomed in Taipei.
Foreign Minister Lin Chia-lung (林佳龍) called it “a major step forward in US–Taiwan relations,” and the Presidential Office said it affirmed shared values.
The Act is rare in modern Washington: authentic bipartisan consensus. It passed the House unanimously in May and the Senate in November without a single dissenting vote, signaling structural backing for Taiwan that transcends any one administration.
It also arrives at a sensitive moment in US–China ties, as Taiwan’s diplomacy gains ground. Its practical impact will take time to gauge, but it can create space for policy that reflects East Asia’s security realities.
Anchoring policy in current realities
The law requires the State Department to review guidelines for US–Taiwan relations every five years, identify opportunities to lift self-imposed restrictions, and take into account that Taiwan is “governed by a representative government peacefully constituted through free and fair elections.” It amends the 2020 Taiwan Assurance Act and makes these reviews a permanent feature of US policy — shifting Washington from a static posture to a rolling, institutional process with built-in momentum.
After 1979, when Washington ended formal ties with Taipei, red lines limited contact between Taiwanese and American officials. Those limits eroded during Trump’s first term, as security cooperation and official exchanges increased. Then–Secretary of State Mike Pompeo lifted restrictions on US–Taiwan contacts; the Biden administration later reinstated guidelines, but in relaxed form.
Nonetheless, Biden’s approach often leaned toward dual clarity — signaling possible military intervention if China attempted an invasion, while opposing formal independence. The new Act is the latest step in aligning policy with present-day realities. Its outcomes will depend on what the reviews surface, but the mechanism can tackle weaknesses rooted in outdated practice and pave the way for further normalization between Taipei and Washington.
Taiwan’s advocacy made this possible
These gains reflect long-run, sophisticated advocacy. Taiwanese officials cultivated ties not only with Congress but with think tanks, state governments, business groups, and civil society. The Formosan Association for Public Affairs (FAPA), in particular, helped build trust and elevate Taiwan as a central US partner.
That multi-track approach has paid off. Even as presidential priorities shift, Taiwan’s relationships across American institutions add ballast.
Yet while Taipei celebrates mandatory five-year reviews, Trump has focused elsewhere — pursuing a trade truce with Beijing, deals on fentanyl, rare earths, and agricultural purchases, and suspensions of tariffs and export controls. During a meeting in South Korea, Trump said the Taiwan issue was not discussed.
In a recent call, Chinese leader Xi Jinping reportedly told Trump that “Taiwan’s return to China is an integral part of the post-war international order.” This is the gap Taipei must navigate: a Congress offering procedural commitment versus a White House that may prioritize deals with Beijing.
The Act ensures regular reviews and opportunities to expand engagement, but it cannot force a president to elevate Taiwan over competing interests. Advocacy must continue. FAPA and others are advancing bills such as the PORCUPINE Act and the Taiwan International Solidarity Act to shape the agenda.
Taipei should drive the review agenda
The law creates openings, but Taiwan must convert them into concrete gains. Taipei should approach each review with specific proposals to strengthen security and widen international engagement. The Act’s cycle provides natural windows to table detailed asks.
The question is not whether the Act is progress — it is — but how Taiwan uses this bureaucratic framework. Taipei cannot wait for Washington to decide which restrictions to lift; instead, it should identify and justify areas where deeper engagement serves both sides.
President Lai’s recent plan for NT$1.25 trillion (US$40 billion) in defense funding over eight years shows alignment with US priorities. The Act is not a security guarantee, but it institutionalizes engagement and sets a baseline future administrations must maintain or explain away.
By testing policy against contemporary realities rather than 1979 assumptions, regular reviews can build continuity. But they also require Taiwan to shape what happens inside the process.
No single statute — short of an implausible revival of a mutual defense treaty — will transform Taiwan’s security. Yet each diplomatic gain adds weight. The Taiwan Assurance Implementation Act alone changes little; together with other wins, it helps make Taiwan harder to ignore, isolate, or threaten.
