In recent months, ties between Taipei and Brussels have revived, driven by Taiwan’s role in global supply chains and the European Union’s push to decouple from China.
Last week, Vice President Hsiao Bi-khim (蕭美琴) addressed the Inter-Parliamentary Alliance on China’s annual summit in the European Parliament, underscoring shared values and challenges and calling for deeper cooperation. Earlier this week, former President Tsai Ing-wen (蔡英文) spoke at the Berlin Freedom Conference, highlighting Taiwan’s democratic resilience and global significance.
Such high-profile engagement would have been unthinkable a few years ago. Today it opens doors for Taiwan’s international integration.
Across economics and security, the EU’s view of Taiwan is shifting from distant economic partner to like-minded democracy and tech power whose stability affects Europe’s own security and prosperity. Europe’s caution is gradually giving way to a more confident, values-driven approach.
For decades, Beijing enforced, at least in part, its interpretation of the “One China” principle across Europe, relegating Taiwan to nonofficial ties. A complicating factor is that Europe has no single “One China” policy but a patchwork of national interpretations.
Some states do not explicitly recognize Taiwan as part of China; others keep a stricter line to protect relations with Beijing. That flexibility enables engagement but prevents a cohesive EU approach — one of the bloc’s enduring weaknesses.
COVID-19 was an early warning of Europe’s tech vulnerabilities and helped spur closer ties with Taipei. In parallel, the EU has moved from accommodation to a more geopolitical posture focused on securing its autonomy.
As a result, national “One China” policies are being reframed to better integrate Taiwan into Europe’s strategic thinking. The EU also recognizes that stability in the Taiwan Strait underpins European security and economic resilience. In 2023, the sides launched the EU–Taiwan Trade and Investment Dialogue to strengthen supply-chain and economic-security cooperation, with the latest round in December 2024.
Normalization is advancing through regular, low-profile exchanges, political statements, and cooperative economic initiatives. An informal partnership is becoming more structured and multidimensional — a context Taiwan can use to reinforce its presence in Europe.
For Taipei, the next step is to target the most reachable partners inside the EU. Central and Eastern European countries such as Lithuania, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia have engaged Taiwan despite the risk of Chinese retaliation. Poland has become a key node for advancing defense-technology cooperation.
At the same time, Taiwan should not neglect larger EU members that still follow a “One China” policy but see cooperation as necessary for their own security. Germany seeks to de-risk with China while deepening work with Taiwan, and France’s 2025 Indo-Pacific strategy underscores the importance of peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait.
Taiwan can also leverage strengths in countering cyberattacks and disinformation to assist European partners — a domain where it has hard-earned experience and a practical entry point for broader EU engagement.
Momentum must be used. Beijing’s pressure remains strong, as seen in Estonia’s stalled plan for a de facto Taiwanese office, delayed over fears of retaliation. Yet Taiwan is gaining traction in Europe and around the world.
A sudden reversal of “One China” policy in Europe is unlikely, but growing EU engagement with Taipei is a hopeful development. Brussels’ refusal to endorse Beijing’s strict interpretation, combined with expanding cooperation, signals a gradual realignment.
Still, divergent national approaches risk inconsistent positions that weaken coherence. A unified EU policy is unrealistic, but better coordination would strengthen collective credibility and limit external interference.
The more Europe diversifies and de-couples from China, the easier it becomes to resist coercion — and the smoother Taiwan’s integration into European frameworks will be.
From trade and technology to democracy and security, the Brussels–Taipei relationship is entering a new phase grounded in shared values and mutual interests. Taiwan’s task is to turn symbolic support into structured cooperation that benefits both sides.
As the EU learns to see Taiwan not only as a risk but as a partner, Taipei should keep demonstrating that democratic resilience and technological leadership make it an indispensable ally in Europe’s pursuit of stability and sovereignty.




