Ukrainian intelligence suggests China is sharing data with Russia for missile strike targeting, which is doubly troubling because this military collaboration extends to seizing Taiwan.

Analysis by the Royal United Services Institute, based on leaked documents from 2023, shares how diverse the cooperation between Beijing and Moscow is. An 800-page document details how Russia plans to supply China’s People’s Liberation Army with infantry fighting vehicles, airborne infiltration special equipment, and a full cycle of training. 

This has the aim of enhancing the PLA’s airborne capabilities in order to seize Taiwan.

The exposure to Russian combat experience in Ukraine gives Chinese planners something textbooks cannot — lessons drawn from large-scale, attrition-based warfare. Beijing’s military learning curve is therefore steepening just as Western attention is fragmenting.

Western governments appear locked in a pattern of rhetorical reassurance, and while US support of Taiwan remains substantial, fears of seeing it bargained away in a trade deal are rising. The reality is that while Moscow and Beijing refine practical pathways to act, the West continues to debate language and posture.

Amid it all, Taiwan waits for like-minded countries to act in defense of a vibrant democracy.

Russia’s support for China

Moscow-Beijing military-technical cooperation has steadily grown since Crimea’s annexation in 2014, and accelerated after the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. Although limited, this cooperation is real and shapes the international security framework. 

According to the leaked documents, which may contain alterations or omissions, Russia’s package reportedly includes:

• 37 BMD-4M amphibious infantry fighting vehicles
• 11 Sprut-SDM1 light amphibious anti-tank self-propelled guns with a 125 mm cannon
• 11 BTR-MDM airborne infantry fighting vehicles
• Several Rubin command and observation vehicles and KSHM-E command vehicles
• Dalnolyot high-altitude parachutes capable of carrying up to 190 kg from about 9,700 meters
• A full training cycle for a PLA paratrooper battalion
• A technical maintenance and repair center to be built in China, including technical documentation for future local production and modernization

Together, these transfers provide all the necessary equipment to reinforce the PLA’s airborne capabilities for an invasion of Taiwan. 

This aims to address one of China’s major operational weaknesses and Taiwan’s key advantage — the extreme risk that an amphibious operation represents. To be able to invade and hold Taiwan, the PLA must be able to project and sustain massed forces.

Taiwan benefits from natural defenses. The Taiwan Strait, first, acts as a buffer zone, and should China invade Taiwan, the PLA would have to transport its forces across it, making them vulnerable to underwater mines, submarines, and precarious sea conditions. Moreover, the number of beaches suitable for landings is both limited and dispersed, forcing the Chinese army to scatter its troops.

If the PLA secured a foothold on Taiwan, it would still face a formidable obstacle, the Central Mountain Range, which covers about 60% of the land surface. Together with wide rice paddies that slow movement, this would complicate the staging of men and supplies, hinder vehicle mobility, and offer little cover.

Hence, this China–Russia cooperation is meant to overcome Taiwan’s natural defenses. By providing armored vehicles intended for paratrooper units, parachute systems, full paratrooper training, and a maintenance hub in China, Moscow is helping Beijing strengthen its airborne assault capacity. 

If the PLA Air Force managed to suppress Taiwan’s air defenses, airdropping armored vehicles near ports and airfields would allow Chinese troops to seize and hold those sites. This would open up multiple fronts across Taiwan and reach deep into its territory.

According to the Royal United Services Institute, enhanced airborne capabilities would also strengthen China’s ability to project power toward nearby infrastructures that could support allied operations, thus complicating any external response. 

The battalion’s worth of landing and parachute equipment further suggests that Beijing intends to expand its fleet of IL-76 military transport aircraft. This, in turn, indicates a possible broader shift in how China envisions a potential invasion of Taiwan.

Two additional elements of this collaboration raise serious concerns. First, Russia’s decision to train PLA paratroopers directly addresses one of the PLA’s main weaknesses: its lack of combat experience. 

Second, Moscow’s willingness to transfer military technologies, something it has long resisted, shows the degree to which Russian and Chinese interests now converge. A Chinese invasion of Taiwan would advance Russia’s own goal of fragmenting the international system. This deepening defense cooperation carries the risk of drawing Taiwan into an even more complex and asymmetric struggle for its sovereignty.

Western passivity

Despite these worrying trends, Taiwan remains largely isolated from the world’s democracies. This goes beyond the lack of de jure recognition, as most Western governments still exclude Taiwan from their broader security calculations. France, for instance, acknowledged the importance of Taiwan and the Strait only in its 2025 National Strategic Review.

This passivity is striking given what is at stake. Economically, Bloomberg Economics estimates that a war over Taiwan could cost about NT$307 trillion (US$10 trillion), or roughly 10% of global GDP in 2024, far exceeding the economic toll of the war in Ukraine and the COVID-19 pandemic.

Normatively, safeguarding Taiwan should be evident. The European Union presents support for democracy as a priority, yet concrete political gestures toward Taiwan remain limited despite their potential to reinforce stability in the strait.

Finally, from a military perspective, no extraordinary measures would be required to deter aggression. However, most Western countries still avoid clearly opposing any unilateral change to the status quo. 

Amphibious invasion is, as the US Department of Defense notes, among the most complex and logistics-intensive military operations, and its success requires air and sea control around the landing area, quick buildup of supplies ashore, and a continuous flow of support. 

In the event of an assault on Taiwan, simply denying China freedom of navigation would already constrain an invasion force that relies on maritime resupply. A firm collective stance would significantly raise the cost of any military action against Taiwan.

The West does not need to declare war to defend Taiwan. However, a firm stance — one that openly supports democracy, sovereignty, and peace — would raise the cost of aggression for Beijing. 

The necessary measures will face China’s reprisals, yet Western countries must balance their formal adherence to the “one China policy” with the reality of what Taiwan represents today: a democratic and technologically advanced economy essential to global trade. Ignoring Taiwan’s security out of fear is ultimately neglecting their own strategic interests.

Taiwan’s future at stake

As Russia and China deepen their military industrial collaboration, the West remains fragmented, constrained by economic interests and reluctant to take concrete actions. The West will likely denounce and respond to any invasion of Taiwan but adopting constructive and affordable diplomatic measures toward China now could avert far greater costs in the future.

The greatest risk, however, falls on Taiwan and its citizens, whose future is too often treated as a pawn in “great power” politics. These developments should also prompt reflection within Taiwan on how national defense is conceived. 

Research shows that natural defenses are often underused in asymmetric defense strategic planning. As China strengthens its capabilities, Taiwan cannot afford to neglect its own inherent advantages.

While a near-term invasion is unlikely, an increasingly assertive China and an enlarged militarization of the strait are narrowing the margin of error and potential peaceful solutions. The expanding Russia–China partnership is yet another sign that Beijing is preparing for the day it may decide force is the only option.

If the West continues to stand by, its passivity will turn a preventable crisis into a defining failure. China’s leverage is undeniable and must be considered in any policy approach, but the “one China policy” no longer reflects the economic, political, or social realities. 

Upholding sovereignty and self-determination should guide action — not fear of a great powers response.