TAIPEI (Taiwan News) — The rise of the People’s Liberation Army’s unmanned underwater vehicles has prompted claims that Taiwan’s indigenous submarines will be obsolete before commissioning, but available evidence and Taiwan’s evolving anti-submarine warfare network indicate the boats will play a central role in deterrence.
In recent years, the PLA has developed new underwater vehicles, such as unmanned underwater vehicles (UUVs), seen as a new threat to Taiwan’s submarines. Some commentators worry that before Taiwan’s indigenous submarines are even commissioned, China may deploy unmanned submarines for reconnaissance or attack that the boats would struggle to counter.
However, military experts note the PLA’s unmanned submarine technology is still developing and subject to many limitations. Moreover, Taiwan’s submarines and anti-submarine warfare (ASW) systems have ways to respond.
First, the PLA’s current UUVs are mostly bulky and noisy, making them easier to detect with the sonar of conventional submarines. The ROC Navy’s submarines can use active sonar to search for these large targets and destroy them with torpedoes.
Second, unmanned submarines must overcome technical bottlenecks in underwater communication and navigation. Today, UUVs mostly rely on pre-programmed autonomous routes or tethered control from a mother ship. If the PLA attempts satellite or radio command, Taiwan can employ electronic warfare to interfere with signals and impede control. Some experts even suggest Taiwan could develop “underwater radio” concepts to intercept or jam communications for enemy UUVs.
Third, even if the PLA uses unmanned submarines for minelaying or surveillance, Taiwan has corresponding countermeasures. The Navy is acquiring UUVs for mine-hunting and plans to upgrade existing mine-hunting ships to enhance anti-mine capabilities. Taiwan has also developed a 100-ton class UUV under NCSIST’s “Huei Long” project for reconnaissance and surveillance; future AI guidance could improve effectiveness against enemy submarines and UUVs.
Overall, PLA unmanned submarines pose a new challenge, but they are not invincible. Taiwan can coordinate submarines with shore-based ASW aircraft, surface ships, and underwater listening systems to build a multi-layered ASW network that uses both traditional and innovative methods to counter UUVs.
Facing this underwater threat, Taiwan is building a three-dimensional countermeasure system that combines manned and unmanned advantages to ensure undersea security. The indigenous submarine program is also incorporating new technologies to counter advanced threats.
The first boat, Hai Kun, features a modern X-shaped stern rudder and silencing technology that significantly improves stealth compared with the older Chien Lung-class. An advanced torpedo countermeasure decoy suite can interfere with incoming torpedoes and improve survivability.
In armament, the Hai Kun class is expected to carry US-made MK-48 heavyweight torpedoes and submarine-launched anti-ship missiles, providing a strong strike capability against enemy surface ships and submarines. These capabilities make the boats a threat not only to conventional submarines but also to large UUVs.
Taiwan is also developing asymmetric assets such as unmanned surface vehicles and drones to operate with its submarines. CSBC Corporation’s “Stingray” unmanned attack boat supports near-shore patrol and attack missions. Future defense operations in the Taiwan Strait will blend manned submarines, unmanned vehicles, and shore-based firepower.
In this system, indigenous submarines will serve as core underwater strikers, while unmanned systems provide reconnaissance, decoying, and interception. Rather than being “outmatched” by PLA unmanned systems, the boats will complement emerging equipment to enhance Taiwan’s underwater combat advantage.
The push for indigenous submarines is based on realistic defense needs and international pressure, not political “vanity.” China’s rapid military rise and increased pressure on Taiwan have forced development of key indigenous combat capabilities for self-preservation. The program reflects the Navy’s decades-long requirement for undersea combat power and Taiwan’s effort to overcome arms-sales constraints and achieve greater defense autonomy.
The program also carries political significance in boosting public morale and demonstrating national will. At its core, however, it serves a concrete strategic purpose: deterring and countering an adversary with a covert and lethal undersea force in a potential Taiwan Strait conflict. Technical challenges and costs require ongoing oversight to avoid waste and delays, but those issues should be resolved through professional review and institutional mechanisms, not by dismissing the program as a “vanity project.”
Taiwan’s first indigenous submarine is nearing commissioning, and follow-on boats are being planned. As the class enters service and integrates with other combat systems, Taiwan’s underwater defense capabilities will grow. The program’s effectiveness will ultimately be judged by performance in operations, not armchair debate.
In sum, promoting indigenous submarines reflects both strategic necessity and practical planning. It is a pragmatic response to a changing security environment and a symbol of defense autonomy. With military effectiveness as the guide, the program can deliver substantial security benefits for Taiwan rather than becoming a purely image-driven project.




