For 16 years the ruling party in Taiwan has enjoyed an outright majority in the Legislative Yuan, giving it the freedom to advance its agenda. 

However, the 2024 election shattered this political pattern as neither the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) nor the Kuomintang (KMT) were able to secure a legislative majority. This offered a unique bargaining position to the relatively fresh Taiwan People’s Party (TPP).

Founded in 2019 by Ko Wen-je (柯文哲), the TPP has branded itself as a third way in Taiwan’s political landscape. The party’s stance is to foster an “inclusive society and effective governance” and to distance itself from political ideologies.  

Yet, the party has formed a coalition with the KMT, backing budget cuts and pledging cooperation in local elections, in an attempt to position itself as a significant opposition force to the DPP. This coalition carries the risk that in pursuit of short-term electoral influence, the TPP could lose its identity and be “absorbed” by the KMT, especially as local elections approach.

Small parties have historically struggled in Taiwan. The TPP, rather than representing a third way alternative, is trying to position itself on Taiwan’s political chessboard. 

If the TPP really wants to represent a concrete political alternative, it must find a way to distinguish itself in Taiwan’s political landscape, with a clear and independent identity. The success or failure of the TPP could have lasting effects on Taiwan’s political landscape, either by cementing the two-party competition or reshaping the power balance among three contenders.

Third way vs coalition

The impressive results of the TPP in 2024 should have offered the party the possibility to defend its own views for Taiwan’s future by bargaining its central legislative role.

However, this quickly unfolded into a constant opposition to what the party has described as an authoritarian regime –– the democratically elected DPP. In order to leverage its influence, the TPP has been heavily aligning with the KMT party line, and this trend has been reinforced under Chair Huang Kuo-chang (黃國昌). 

While this coalition has enabled the TPP to establish itself as an opposition party, to pass legislation and to reinforce its position within the legislature, it has also eroded its image as an independent alternative.

Indeed, the TPP’s vision for Taiwan was initially centered around addressing some of Taiwan’s most critical issues such as its energy security, national defense, and everyday problems faced by many Taiwanese. It distinguished itself from the strong emphasis on national identity and cross-strait relations that characterize the KMT-DPP competition. 

This focus on national economic issues initially attracted young and well-educated electoral supporters, dissatisfied with both the DPP and KMT. However, support for the TPP steadily declined last year, notably due to a corruption scandal surrounding former chair and founder Ko, as well as controversial proposals by the KMT-TPP coalition to expand the legislative and constitutional powers –– leading to the “Great Recall.”

While this continuous erosion of its partisan base seems to have been halted, this is likely the result of people’s frustration with the DPP’s failure during the Great Recall rather than a decisive shift in the party affiliation spectrum.

The current coalition is blurring lines, undermining the work done by the TPP legislators and the party’s achievements, which ultimately damages the TPP’s stance as an independent party. Even though this alliance may only be temporary, the current shift to pan-blue could deeply affect the TPP’s future capacity to attract independent voters.

The collusion with the KMT may also undermine TPP cross-strait policy. While the TPP has not been vocal on the matter, and instead advocated for a pragmatic stance, the elephant in the room must be addressed and may threaten the party’s future maximization of votes by entangling it with ban-blue votes.

TPP cross-strait policy

The TPP must face this security reality –– the leeway regarding cross-strait relations is becoming increasingly narrow, and will therefore be pushed to adopt an increasingly black-or-white position. 

This situation deeply limits the TPP’s ability to present itself as a proper third way. Indeed, the current political solutions to the status quo are rather binary: unification, independence, or continuation of the status quo. 

Given that the first two possibilities are each unacceptable to one side of the strait, the margin to properly advocate for a third way is limited and somewhat disconnected from reality.

The TPP has advocated for “Taiwan’s Sovereignty, Cross-Strait Peace,” by advocating a change in how cross-strait policies are being handled. The party’s standpoint is that the DPP is too provocative toward China, while the KMT is seen as too weak to China.

However, this stance may not be practically achievable. Taiwan’s sovereignty cannot be reconciled with cross-strait peace, as the CCP has long denied Taiwan’s sovereignty and will continue to do so. 

By aiming to distance itself from both the DPP and the KMT, the TPP’s cross-strait policy falls short and does not provide any substantial solutions for the future. Moreover, the continuous attacks on the defense budget by the KMT-TPP coalition undermine the TPP’s stance, as it aligns closely with that of the KMT.

Bandwagoning with the KMT on cross-strait policy could be catastrophic for the TPP, as it would fail to represent a strong enough alternative to replace the KMT, while at the same time losing independent voters.

These challenges to cross-strait policy highlight a broader uncertainty for the TPP. As the party struggles to define its own course on core national issues, internal instability and external pressures converge and raise fundamental questions about the TPP’s long-term viability.

Lasting influence 

The current internal situation is destabilizing: the founder and former leader of the TPP is currently facing charges for allegedly accepting bribes, while retaining a deep influence over the party structure. Meanwhile, Huang Kuo-chang is pushing the TPP-KMT coalition further, while focusing the party’s efforts on countering the DPP.

The upcoming local elections will provide a first glimpse of what the TPP’s future may be. The results will show if the party still has room to expand its electoral base, or if, on the contrary, it has already reached its glass ceiling. 

This is where the TPP faces a critical question for its survival: cooperate with the KMT at the expense of its independence or take the risk of a major defeat. 

Indeed, the TPP needs the KMT to secure some nominations, but this cooperation carries the risk of getting absorbed. For example, the KMT-TPP cooperation to win New Taipei City mayoral race may principally benefit the KMT, and undermine Huang Kuo-chang’s (黃國昌) chance of winning.

This situation is further exacerbated by the party’s nonideological stance, which negatively impacts the TPP’s ability to mobilize its electoral base’s loyalty. While the KMT and the DPP can count on their respective ideological frameworks to rally voters, the TPP lacks the grassroots supporters that the DPP and KMT have.

The TPP’s strength lies in its ability to appeal to the very large percentage of Taiwanese who identify as independent. Nonetheless, an intertwined political strategy with the KMT could alienate part of these electors. 

Without a unique identity, the TPP risks facing the same fate as the People’s First Party and the New Party –– becoming an extension of the KMT.

However, the current path that is taken by the party could reflect a willingness to replace the KMT rather than offering a third way, and instead become the first choice for the pan-blue voters. As explained by Kharis Templeman, this goal would require a carefully balanced strategy that can convince pan-blue electors to accept the TPP as one of them, and then effectively persuade these voters that the TPP is the most viable way.

The success or failure of the TPP in achieving any of these objectives will prove transformative for Taiwan’s political landscape. If the TPP fails to forge a clear and independent path, it risks becoming yet another footnote in Taiwan’s political history rather than the transformative force it once aspired to be.