Christopher Chivvis and Stephen Wertheim at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace present a fundamentally flawed interpretation of the evolving power dynamics in the Taiwan Strait, in their May 1 Foreign Policy op-ed titled “Trump Should Rein in Taiwan.”
By characterizing President Lai Ching-te’s (賴清德) actions as a “salami-slicing” push toward independence, the authors not only misconstrue Taiwan’s defensive posture but also risk endorsing a dangerous framework of victim-blaming. This obscures the root cause of regional instability: China’s rising belligerence and military expansionism.
Lai’s designation of China as a “foreign hostile force” and implementation of 17 “proactive measures” to combat Chinese infiltration are pragmatic responses to tangible, ever-increasing threats. Labeling these policies as political escalations or acts of provocation fundamentally misrepresents the strategic realities facing the vibrant democracy.
In contrast, the term "salami-slicing" is more accurately applied to China's own incremental and often opaque tactics. These include the militarization of artificial islands in the South China Sea, economic coercion campaigns targeting Australia, Lithuania, and South Korea, persistent cyber intrusions against the US and European nations, and provocative military maneuvers directed at Taiwan, Japan, and India.
A clear illustration of China’s escalatory behavior is its violation of the Taiwan Strait median line, a tacit boundary that has served as a stabilizing convention for over six decades. According to statistics from Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense, the People’s Liberation Army conducted over 1,700 median line crossings in both 2022 and 2023.
In 2024, that number surged to more than 3,000 sorties, accompanied by the intrusion of over 110 surveillance balloons into Taiwan’s airspace. Simultaneously, Chinese naval vessels have conducted increasingly frequent patrols in the surrounding waters, eroding the status quo at sea. These actions reflect a deliberate strategy of gray-zone coercion aimed at reshaping the operational environment and normalizing military intimidation.
Toned down rhetoric
This aggressive posture is not confined to the Taiwan Strait. China's military coercion has taken place in the East China Sea, where PLA aircraft harass US, Japanese, and South Korean forces. They have extended to the South China Sea, where Chinese coast guard and maritime militia units have rammed Philippine vessels and harassed Vietnamese fishermen and oil operations.
In this broader context, Chinese leader Xi Jinping has repeatedly affirmed his intention to annex Taiwan. Therefore, suggesting that the burden of de-escalation lies with Taiwan is akin to expecting the Allies to reduce airlift during the Berlin Crisis, or demanding that Ukraine avoid provoking Russia.
In this light, the authors suggest the US should pressure Taiwan to tone down its rhetoric. That is tantamount to appeasement.
As we know, appeasement of authoritarian regimes rarely leads to peace and stability. Just as failing to support Czechoslovakia emboldened Hitler, failing to support Taiwan fully would encourage Xi to exploit the opening.
As a democracy facing an existential threat, Taiwan must be able to signal resolve not only through armaments but also through political messaging. Lai's rhetoric serves this dual purpose: it reinforces internal cohesion and communicates strategic clarity to allies and adversaries alike.
The authors' comparison to former US President George W. Bush's stance toward President Chen Shui-bian (陳水扁) similarly neglects the dramatic expansion in China's military capabilities over the past quarter century.
‘Useful fiction’
Before ex-US House Speaker Newt Gingrich visited Taiwan in 1997, he stated that while the US acknowledged the “one China” policy, any attempt by China to seize Taiwan by force would prompt a US military response. Beijing's response to Gingrich's visit was restrained. There were no military or diplomatic reprisals.
By contrast, when Speaker Nancy Pelosi visited Taiwan in 2022, China launched unprecedented military exercises simulating blockades and missile strikes. What changed between 1997 and 2022 was not Taiwan's conduct, but China's economic leverage and significantly enhanced military capabilities.
This transformation has emboldened Beijing rather than incentivized compliance with international norms. Furthermore, the authors’ idea that China would stop its intimidation if Taiwan merely returned to some “useful fiction” like “one China of some kind” is naive.
Taiwan’s former President Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九) pursued this very line from 2008 to 2016. During his tenure, Taiwan’s defense budget declined, and critical military R&D institutions like the National Chung-Shan Institute of Science and Technology had their budgets slashed and personnel reduced.
Ma's accommodating approach did nothing to appease Beijing. Instead, China used that time to ramp up its military expansion and further isolate Taiwan diplomatically. If anything, Ma's cowed response demonstrates that unilateral goodwill from Taiwan only leads to more “wolf warrior” tactics later.
Would Beijing abandon its coercive strategy if the China-leaning KMT, which Ma belongs to, returned to power and endorsed the Chinese Communist Party’s version of "one China"? The empirical record suggests otherwise.
China's revisionist ambitions extend well beyond Taiwan to encompass territorial disputes with India, Japan, and multiple Southeast Asian states. Moreover, it considers US military deployments in the Philippines provocative.
The challenge is not Taiwan's assertiveness but China's expansionist agenda, rooted in authoritarian nationalism and bolstered by a rapidly modernizing military.
Taiwan independence
Within this strategic context, the authors’ proposal that Washington and Beijing exchange public assurances is equally problematic. Advocating that the US renounce support for Taiwan's independence "except with the consent of both sides" grants Beijing de facto veto power over Taiwan's future. Such a formulation risks signaling to other democracies that their sovereignty is negotiable under duress.
Likewise, the call for a resumption of cross-strait dialogue ignores the fact that Beijing has unilaterally suspended talks and imposed preconditions incompatible with democratic norms. The so-called "1992 Consensus", a vague and politically expedient construct fictionalized by the KMT and promoted by the CCP, was never a mutually accepted agreement.
Rather, it served as a diplomatic fig leaf. The notion that Taiwan can restart negotiations simply by uttering the right incantation is unrealistic. Constructive dialogue and lasting peace cannot occur under the shadow of military coercion.
Additionally, the current US approach to Taiwan is inherently conflicted. While it provides Taiwan with arms, it continues to adhere to a policy of strategic ambiguity.
This ambivalence neither deters Beijing nor reassures Taipei. Given Taiwan's centrality to regional stability and global supply chains, particularly in semiconductors and artificial intelligence, the US must move beyond hedging. It should enable Taiwan to negotiate from a position of strength, not constrain it under the guise of stability.
Peace from resolve
Undermining Taiwan's confidence in US commitments risks destabilizing the region and weakening US strategic credibility. Rather than pressing Taiwan to temper its language, Washington should intensify its support for Taiwan’s deterrence posture.
A coherent and principled US policy would make clear that any use of force against Taiwan will incur severe consequences and reaffirm Taiwan's right to self-defense and participation in the international community, as US Secretary of State Marco Rubio has articulated.
In conclusion, the challenge is not Lai Ching-te's assertiveness, but Washington's conceptual ambiguity and strategic indecision.
The Trump administration must critically reassess its inherited and outdated "one China" policy, which no longer reflects the geopolitical or normative realities of the Indo-Pacific. Rather than pressuring Taiwan to step back, the US must recognize the nation’s intrinsic value as a democratic ally and technological linchpin and stand firmly against authoritarian coercion.
Peace comes not from retreat, but from resolve.
The author previously served as a distinguished adjunct faculty member at Taiwan’s War College, specializing in cross-strait security and strategic affairs. He has over 35 years of professional experience in the US defense and aerospace industries.
