TAIPEI (Taiwan News) — The Global Taiwan Institute released an extensive report detailing China’s covert operations in Taiwan to achieve its goal of annexation.
China’s efforts to undermine Taiwanese society fall under three major categories, GTI said, including intelligence, cyberspace, and United Front work.
Intelligence operations
China frequently targets Taiwanese military personnel, ranging from high-ranking officers to junior policy staffers to spy on Beijing’s behalf, GTI said. “The number of cases [we are investigating] has increased significantly compared with previous years... posing a severe challenge to national security work,” National Security Bureau Director Tsai Ming-yen (蔡明彥) said last summer.
In 2023, Taiwanese authorities investigated 84 cases, leading to 39 prosecutions.
GTI warned that though the statistics may seem like Taiwan is successfully combatting Chinese espionage, these cases likely only provide “a glimpse of the CCP intelligence iceberg.”
Additionally, more Taiwanese active-duty officers involved in day-to-day operations have been targeted in the past decade, such as Brigadier General Lo Hsien-che (羅賢哲) and Major General Hsu Nai-chuan (許乃權).
Beijing’s use of money as an incentive has grown in terms of amount and how financial vulnerabilities are exploited, GTI said. For example, Taiwan Air Force Colonel Liu Sheng-shu (劉聖恕) received bonuses for each agent he recruited, depending on their access to valuable information. Meanwhile, military veteran Lu Chi-hsien (魯紀賢) targeted potential agents by visiting pawnshops, moneylenders, and loan sharks near military facilities.
Another trend among Taiwanese espionage cases is loyalty oaths, per GTI. More targets are made to swear allegiance to China in different ways. In 2023, two Taiwanese military officers received payments after recording videos expressing their intent to surrender to the People’s Liberation Army in a cross-strait conflict.
In another instance, Army Colonel Hsiang Te-en (向德恩), reportedly posed for a photo with a note vowing to “support cross-strait peaceful unification.” Hsiang also pledged to “do my best at my current post to fulfill the glorious task of pushing for peaceful unification for the motherland.”
Beijing has also begun trying to recruit journalists, political pundits, and others as agents of influence, GTI said.
The institute cautioned against complacency, saying that Beijing has more funds, personnel, and other resources to infiltrate Taiwan than Taipei has to counter it. Each espionage case represents “a loss of trust and a loss of integrity” in Taiwan’s security, it added.
Cyberspace operations
Taiwan’s network infrastructure faces the highest rate of cyberattacks in the Asia-Pacific region in recent years, GTI said. Chinese hackers collect information on Taiwan’s diplomacy, military, society, and economy.
From late 2023 to April 2024, one Chinese hacking group, Flax Typhoon, used “leased servers and compromised network infrastructure” to hit Taiwanese government networks, overseas diplomatic posts, universities and think tanks, and electronics companies.
Another hacking group, Storm-0558, is known for targeting US and European individuals with links to Taiwan, GTI said. US Representative Don Bacon, a member of the House Taiwan Caucus, was a victim of the group’s attack on Microsoft Exchange Online in 2023 after it acquired a Microsoft Services Account cryptographic key.
Chinese hackers also try to steal intellectual property from Taiwanese companies and chip manufacturers. On one occasion, hackers stole chip design coding from companies based in Hsinchu Industrial Park by exploiting errors in the companies’ virtual private networks, according to GTI.
Russia has played a growing role in cyberattacks on Taiwan in the last 15 years. Beijing and Moscow share information on targets’ weaknesses and may even coordinate plans. For example, one Russian group launched “disruptive denial of service attacks” on Taiwanese financial institutions, including the Taiwan Stock Exchange and the Directorate General of Budget, Accounting, and Statistics.
GTI said that “Taiwan cannot rest easy” when it comes to China’s cyberattacks. It urged Taiwan to boost its cybersecurity significantly, particularly regarding critical infrastructure.
United Front work
Local-level exchanges are the foundation of China’s approach to influencing and cultivating relationships that can serve its political objectives, GTI said. These “far-reaching” exchanges include areas such as youth engagement, culture, and economy.
Youth exchanges range from hosting summer camps to promoting dialogue between universities and offering study or internship opportunities, the institute said.
The Taiwan-based Chinese Planner Association has partnered with the CCP’s All-China Federation of Taiwan Compatriots for thirty years to organize the “Cross-Strait Peace Angels Exchange and Visits," according to GTI. Another well-known event is the Cross-Strait Youth Forum, which is co-hosted by the All-China Youth Federation in Beijing, the Department of KMT Nationwide Youth Work, and Chinese Youth International in Taipei.
Many cultural exchanges, such as the one between the Taiwan Youth Chaoshan Cultural Experience Camp and Shantou-Taiwan Characteristic Industry, are hosted by local Taiwan Affairs Offices and the United Front Work Department, per GTI. These events are channels for influence operations, it said.
United Front Work Department and Taiwan Affairs Office officials were present at the above-mentioned events, proving that these activities are aimed at fostering pro-Beijing sentiment and paving the way for “future political and social leverage,” GTI said.
Meanwhile, economic exchanges help deepen cross-strait development. GTI pointed out that Chinese leader Xi Jinping (習近平) has said the Cross-Strait CEO Summit is a key platform for Beijing’s economic integration efforts. The summit is overseen by the Taiwan Affairs Office and headed by United Front officials such as Lin Jun (林軍).
The summit has a sister organization in Taiwan with the same name and is headed by former Taiwanese officials and industry leaders.
The CCP has also focused on cultivating pro-Beijing sentiment among Taiwan’s three major political parties. Senior KMT leaders often visit China and engage with top United Front officials, including Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference Chairman Wang Huning (王滬寧).
The level of engagement between the DPP and the CPP is difficult to gauge because Beijing does not want to highlight any links, given its anti-China stance, GTI said. However, the institute suggested China may be using Control Yuan President and former Kaohsiung Mayor Chen Chu (陳菊) as “a bridge” between the DPP and CCP."
Chen first visited China in 2009 to promote the World Games and later made a trip in 2013 to meet with Zhang Zhijun (張志軍), then-minister of the Taiwan Affairs Office, to promote the Asia Pacific Cities Summit.
China first began forming a relationship with the TPP in 2015 when Ko Wen-je (柯文哲) was the mayor of Taipei. During the 2015 Shanghai-Taipei City Forum, Ko said, “Both sides of the strait are one family.”
In 2023 and 2024, the Straits Forum invited TPP representatives to attend, which the party denied. In September 2024, the Taiwan Affairs Office lauded Ko’s criticism of Lai Ching-te (賴清德) for persecuting individuals who “do not agree with Taiwan independence.”
GTI said the CCP’s United Front campaign in Taiwan “is extensive” but noted that not everyone involved in cross-strait exchanges is necessarily part of the United Front. “It remains difficult to measure, demonstrating the need for continued vigilance,” GTI said.
Policy recommendations
The institute said Taiwan could require publicly accessible registration when acting on behalf of a foreign principal. Those who failed to do so would be prosecuted.
To strengthen security vetting through its national security clearance system, Taiwan must hold government employees to a higher standard of behavior, including criminal consequences in cases of severe information leaks. GTI also recommended increasing the penalties for espionage.
For cybersecurity, Taiwan should create mandatory cybersecurity certification programs to enhance critical infrastructure protection, GTI said.
The report comes as Lai begins to implement a comprehensive 17-point strategy to counter China’s efforts to undermine Taiwan’s sovereignty. Beijing is infiltrating Taiwan’s military through espionage and uses cross-strait exchanges as a means of conducting United Front operations, he said last month. “We have no choice but to take more proactive measures.”
The multi-faceted plan calls for numerous changes to government approaches and regulations, including restoring the military court system, risk management for Chinese visitors to Taiwan, global advocacy against Chinese threats to Taiwan, and bolstering legal frameworks.
