TAIPEI (Taiwan News) — The National Security Bureau on Sunday released an analysis of Chinese Communist Party infiltration techniques so the public can understand CCP espionage tactics.
The NSB reported the number of individuals prosecuted for Chinese espionage rose from 16 and 10 in 2021 and 2022 to 48 and 64 in 2023 and 2024. Similarly, the number of Chinese espionage cases prosecuted climbed from three in 2021 and five in 2022 to 14 in 2023 and 15 in 2024.
Current and retired military personnel constitute the largest proportion of prosecutions. In 2024, 15 retired service members (23%) and 28 active-duty personnel (43%) were indicted, indicating that the CCP has targeted these groups.
The NSB identified five major infiltration channels: criminal gangs, underground financial networks, front companies, temple groups, and civic groups. The CCP’s methods involve recruiting active-duty troops through retired soldiers, establishing online connections, offering monetary inducements, and using debt coercion.
It said these efforts were designed to infiltrate Taiwan’s military units, government agencies, and pro-China organizations. The CPP sought to obtain sensitive national defense information, develop spy networks, and even interfere in democratic elections.
The NSB said that the CCP collaborates with criminal gangs in Taiwan to form armed support groups. This includes recruiting gang members to display the Chinese flag and acts of sabotage during a Taiwan invasion.
It said the CCP uses gang members to recruit retired military personnel and organize former military cohorts into sniper teams. The teams are tasked with planning sniper missions against targets such as Taiwan's military facilities and foreign representative offices in Taiwan.
The NSB said the CCP also leverages retired military personnel to set up shell companies, operate underground financial networks, and run casinos. These activities induce or coerce active-duty soldiers into collecting military intelligence, signing loyalty pledges to the CCP, or piloting military helicopters to defect to China.
In addition, the CCP provides financial support to temple organizations in Taiwan, using religious activities to approach active-duty military personnel. They are lured into actions such as filming videos wearing military uniforms while holding the Chinese flag or handing over documents such as military defense plans.
The NSB pointed out that the CCP instructed Taiwanese civic associations to establish "CCP United Front Work Committees." During the election period, these associations invited borough chiefs and residents to travel to China. They also attempt to influence elections by releasing false polls and news reports.
The agency noted that the CCP has been using platforms like Facebook, LINE, and LinkedIn to provide loans to active-duty and retired military personnel. The purpose is to facilitate the exchange of sensitive information in return for debt repayment or to introduce military personnel to organizations.
The agency added the CCP has been sending virtual currency payments with these contacts in Taiwan to avoid detection.