China could use drones to affect upcoming Taiwan election

Taiwan’s Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) and the Ministry of National Defense (MND) need to prepare for a response in the event the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) People’s Liberation Army (PLA) uses drones to force them into a lose-lose decision, while producing a win-win outcome for the CCP and the opposition Kuomintang (KMT) in the upcoming presidential election.   

Drones have become the latest weapon used by China to threaten Taiwan. On May 11, the PLA sent two drones to fly near Taiwan and one to circle it. Below is a picture of the flight profiles of the piloted aircraft and the three drones: a CH-4 (brown line), a BZK-005 (green line), and a TB-001 (yellow line).

WZ-7 drone (Wikipedia photo)

WZ-10 drone (Wikipedia photo)

The WZ-8 has not flown near or over Taiwan according to all available sources. However, it could be the first drone to overfly Taiwan.

WZ-8 drone (Wikipedia photo)

WZ-8 specifications

• Cruise speed: 7,408–8,643 km/h (Mach 6 to Mach 7)


• Service ceiling: 50,000 m (160,000 ft)


• Range: 5,000 km


• Air Launched: H-6N or H-6M bomber (max range 8,000 km)

Assuming an average cruising speed of 8,000 km/h, the WZ-8 would cross Taiwan’s widest length from west to east (145 km) in about 65 seconds. It would be difficult to intercept the WZ-8 on an overflight of Taiwan, due to challenges, including detecting an object at a high altitude and speed and hitting a maneuvering target.

The WZ-8 is a challenge for Taiwan, and for Japan, South Korea, the U.S., and other countries in the region. A Discord leak depicted the WZ-8 conducting notional overflights over South Korea and Taiwan launched from H-6M bombers (see below) from Liu’an (also referred to as Lu’an) Air Base. A recent Defense News article reinforced the Discord leak that WZ-8 drones are at Liu’an Air Base.

The formerly classified document from the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency circulated in a Discord chatroom in April that was later obtained by the Washington Post. (Washington Post screenshot)

The document compares the speeds and altitudes of the WZ-8 (Mach 3 and 30,480 m) to the WZ-7 (Mach 0.8 and 18,288 m), CH-4 (Mach 0.2 and 5,487 m) and CAP-01 (Mach 0.6 and 4,267 m).

The WZ-9 (also called WZ-2000) is a high-altitude long endurance (HALE) drone. However, in comparison to the WZ-8, the WZ-9’s cruising speed is not supersonic (propeller driven) and does not fly as high as the WZ-8 at a maximum altitude of 18,000 m.

WZ-9 drone (tvd.im photo)

Some people recall seeing photos of a PLA balloon with drones attached to it. Analysts claimed that these drones were placed on the balloon for flight testing, but no one mentioned that placing drones on balloons had other uses.

Glide vehicles similar to the WZ-8 hanging from a PLA balloon. (CCTV screenshot photo)

By placing a WZ-8 or a similar drone on a high-altitude balloon, the WZ-8 can be launched to conduct overflight operations against near and far away targets. The WZ-8 can also be weaponized. It’s mission payloads include reconnaissance gear or a strike mission using conventional or nuclear warheads.

The WZ-8 is the best PLA choice for overflying Taiwan if the CCP does not want it to be shot down due to its high altitude and rapid speed.

The CPP has flown three drone models around Taiwan:  the BZK-005 (April 27), the TB-001 (May 2), and the CH-4 (May 11). If the PLA wants Taiwan to shoot down a drone, then it could use any of the other drones that have flown near or around Taiwan (BZK-005, BZK-007, CH-4, TB-001, WZ-7, and WZ-10).

The BZK-005 is the most likely drone the PLA would employ for an intentional shootdown scenario. The BZK-005 has flown an average of 7.6 sorties per month since September 2022, which is greater than any other drone that has flown around Taiwan (thanks to Gerald C. Brown and Ben Lewis for the use of their data collected from Taiwan’s MND and Japan’s MOD):

• BZK-005 (7.6 sorties/month)


• BZK-007 (3.3 sorties/month)


• CH-4 (3.33 sorties/month)


• TB-001 (2.33 sorties/month)


• WZ-7 (2.5 sorties/month)


• WZ-10 (1 sortie/month).

According to JANES and Japan’s MOD, the BZK-005 is the only PLA drone that appears to have crossed into Taiwan’s territorial waters on April 27 and May 2.

Taiwan’s military options to counter PLA drones

Taiwan has surface to air missiles (SAMs), air-to-air missiles, and naval surface to air missiles to counter PLA drones flying into it its territory. Listed below are the surface and the air-to-air systems (the naval SAMs are similar):

Surface-to-air missile (SAM) systems

• Avenger


• Chaparral


• Stinger


• I-HAWK


• Patriot Advanced Capability 3 (PAC-3)


• Tien Kung II (Sky Bow II)


• Tien Kung III (Sky Bow III)

Taiwan’s notional medium- and long-range air defense systems (IISS photo)

Air-to-air anti-aircraft systems

• AIM-7M Sparrow


• AIM-9M Sidewinder


• AIM-9P-4 Sidewinder


• AIM-120C AMRAAM


• Tien Chien 1 (Sky Sword 1) (air-to-air capability)


• Tien Chien 2 (Sky Sword 2) (air-to-air)


• MICA Air-to-Air


• R 550 Magic 2 Air-to-Air

Many of these systems can intercept slow-flying propeller-powered drones and jet-powered drones flying up to 18,288 - 19,812 m. If the WZ-8 is flying above 30,480 m, none of the air-to-air missiles in Taiwan’s inventory would be able to shoot it down. The most likely anti-air system for this task could be the indigenous surface-to-air Tien Kung III (Sky Bow III) missile.

The Tien Kung II (TK II) has a maximum altitude of 30,480 m (100,000 ft). This maximum will not allow the TK II to shoot down the WZ-8 if it flies above 30,480 m.

The Tien Kung III (TKIII) is reported to have a maximum altitude of 45 km (147,638 ft), which places it close to the WZ-8’s maximum altitude. Recent reporting indicates that Taiwan has developed an enhanced TK III that could reach up to an altitude of 70 kilometers while another version is being tested for up to 100 km.

The next challenge faced by Taiwan’s air defense is the PLA could design a flight path that places the WZ-8 in a challenging position for the TK III to shoot it down. For example, the WZ-8 could fly through the outer engagement envelope of the TK III, meaning that the probability of hitting is greatly decreased.

Due to the WZ-8’s speed, altitude, and its maneuvering capability, none of the Taiwanese missiles might be able to hit it. For example, analyzing the nominal flight path shown in the WZ-8 Discord leak document (above), the WZ-8 could challenge TK III’s abilities.

Another dilemma would be a political decision about falling debris. The PLA could claim that the WZ-8 did not overfly Taiwan and therefore Taiwan is at fault for shooting down a PLA military aircraft that was flying through international airspace.

Depending on how the TK III missile hit the WZ-8, the debris could fall on Taiwan or in Taiwan’s territorial waters, or even outside of it’s territorial waters based on the altitude, wind, and the number of objects created by the impact. Taiwan’s government should prepare for the propaganda war that would ensue after a shootdown.

PLA balloon and drone

Just as the PLA balloon flying over the U.S. earlier this year caught the attention of American citizens and forced the U.S. president to respond, the Taiwanese government might not be able to hide or pretend a drone overflight did not occur. Somebody might see the drones, or the Japanese or some other source could report the overflight.

If the Taiwanese become aware that the PLA is conducting or has conducted overflights without any action by the government, the people would demand a response and the DPP government would lose trust and credibility.

Conclusion

This article details how the CCP uses drones to conduct grey zone warfare against Taiwan. I hope that the Taiwanese government has “war-gamed” these scenarios and has a response plan the people of Taiwan and the friends of the country can understand and support.

The political leadership in Taiwan may not want to shoot down a PLA drone due to fears about the KMT and the CCP exploiting the results to increase the chances of the KMT winning the 2024 elections. The CCP is trying to place the DPP into the classic lose-lose scenario.

In either case, the CCP and KMT will take advantage of a DPP response to a PLA drone overflight. Listed below are apparent options:

• Do nothing: If the Taiwanese government does nothing, then the KMT will claim that the DPP is incompetent and cannot protect Taiwan’s national security.


• Attempt to shoot it down: If President Tsai orders the military to destroy the drone, then the KMT will broadcast its campaign slogan of “peace or war” and claim that the DPP is irresponsible and is inciting China to attack Taiwan.


• Shoot and miss: If Taiwan’s military attempts and fails to shoot down the drone, the PLA can continue to fly drones over Taiwan to reinforce the idea that they can conduct these flights with impunity and the KMT will claim DPP incompetence.


• Wild card option: If the U.S. were to shoot down the PLA drone in Taiwan’s airspace, the Taiwanese government may avoid the lose-lose dilemma that the CCP tried to create. I intend to explain in another article how this could be accomplished.

The Taiwanese deserve to know the truth and need a leadership that will be transparent about the reality everyone in Taiwan faces. The entire population is placed at risk of being unprepared for a conflict and — possibly losing the nation to Chinese Communism — by leaders who refrain from making decisions due to fears of frightening people about their true reality.

This article only provided one example of the CCP’s option to create a lose-lose option for the DPP. The Taiwanese government needs to immunize the population against these future lose-lose scenarios that the CCP will create to embarrass the DPP and enhance the KMT’s political position for the upcoming elections. The first step is to educate the population before these no-win scenarios occur, especially a drone overflight scenario.

Let’s hope the Taiwanese government tells its citizens the truth, responds appropriately to the aggression, prepares the population, works with other countries to deter the CCP, and informs the people of the situation. The reverse would be a nightmare for all Taiwanese citizens and the rest of the world.