While April 27 seemed like another normal day in Taiwan, it was anything but.

The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) flew two drones by Taiwan that day, with one, a long-range armed drone, flying around the country for the first time. Then, on May 2, the PLA launched another drone around Taiwan.

This article will explain the significance of the PLA’s action and why the absence of a resolute response by Taiwan invites additional aggression.

Since August 2022, the PLA Air Force (PLAAF) and Navy (PLAN) have incrementally increased the number of fighter aircraft and naval ships operating around Taiwan. These ships and aircraft are crossing red lines that both Taiwan and China observed until recently.

But no political or military leader in Taiwan and no ally expressed alarm. In the PLA’s actions against Taiwan, we are witnessing the slow cooking frog fable.

What happened?

On April 27, the PLAAF sent two drones to conduct reconnaissance operations against Taiwan: a TB-001 Scorpion and a BZK-005 Long Eagle. Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense (MND) reported for the first time that the Scorpion’s flight circled the country (see MND map below). Then on May 2, a Long Eagle also circled the nation in the reverse direction (see second MND map below).

Flight paths of PLA aircraft on April 27 with TB-001 Scorpion’s in pink. (MND photo)

Flight paths of PLA aircraft on May 2 with BZK-005 Long Eagle’s in brown. (MND photo)

The following are some observations about the two flights:

• Flight location: The eastern side of Taiwan is difficult to reach from China. Moreover, mountains block the PLA from directly observing Taiwan’s military bases in the east. During a conflict, the PLA would have to prevent these bases from responding to CCP aggression. Therefore, except for intelligence satellite coverage and local spies, the PLA uses reconnaissance drones to fill gaps in their intelligence.

• Flight direction: The TB-001 flew counter-clockwise and the BZK-005 flew clockwise around the country. The different flight directions could indicate that the PLAAF is preparing to conduct increased drone operations by flying Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) from different directions and locations to provide enhanced coverage of the eastern half of Taiwan.

• Flight path: Although each flight path looks identical according to Taiwan’s MND, the BZK-005 flown on May 2 added an additional waypoint (see map above) on the northeastern side of the nation that brings it much closer than the path the TB-001 flew on April 27. Getting closer could become a pattern that the PLAAF pursues to intimidate Taiwan and to assess when the Taiwanese Air Force or ground air defense elements will react to close incursions.

(Janes photo)

• Intelligence collection: According to defense analysis news agency Janes using Japan’s Ministry of Defense (MOD) reporting, the BZK-005 flight path did not just add a waypoint, it also conducted an intelligence collection orbit off the central east coast of Taiwan (see Janes map above). Janes’ depiction of the orbit corresponds to intelligence collection near Hualien-Jiashan Air Force Base (AFB) and Taitung Chihhang AFB (see ROC Air Force graphic below for more details about these bases).

ROC Air Force (CIGeography photo)

Further examination of PLA maneuvers after former House Speaker Pelosi’s visit in August 2022 reveals that the PLA conducted a similar intelligence collection orbit off the central eastern coast of Taiwan close to the two Air Force bases previously mentioned (see map below).

PLA drone orbit off Taiwan’s central eastern coast (shown in yellow) during August 3-5, 2022, according to Japan’s MOD. (CIGeography photo)

• Drone payload: Both drones have intelligence collection and communications capabilities. Furthermore, the Scorpion is an armed drone, also called an unmanned combat aerial vehicle (UCAV). The PLA has a Long Eagle variant that is armed, but with fewer munitions and lighter payload than the Scorpion.

• Diversion of Taiwan’s assets: PLA drones could be flying on the east coast to draw some of Taiwan’s air defense systems away from the west and other coastal areas to reduce their use against the PLA’s main offensive plan of a blockade or an invasion. The PLA also could send unmanned surface vehicles (USVs) and unmanned underwater vehicles (UUVs) to draw some of Taiwan’s anti-ship and anti-submarine capabilities from the west coast to the east coast. Again, this tactic reduces the threat to PLA military assets attacking Taiwan from the west side of the country.

TB-001A variant (weibo user @前站起飛 photo)

TB-001 and TB-001A armed reconnaissance drone

The TB-001’s function is to conduct reconnaissance and drop bombs or fire missiles at targets as far away as 20-100 kilometers. The Scorpion is a medium altitude long endurance (MALE) drone.

The PLA developed an enhanced variant of the original TB-001, designated as the TB-001A (see above picture). The “A” variant has an engine on the tail with a maximum takeoff weight increased from 2,800 kg to 3,200 kg, payload from 1,200 kg to 1,500 kg, flight ceiling from 8,000 meters to 9,500 meters, and a shortened takeoff distance of 500 meters.

Most importantly, both Scorpion variants have a maximum flight endurance of 35 hours. The “A” variant can carry 12 air-to-ground bombs including two air-to-surface missiles on the centerline of the UAV. The TB-001 can fire the 80 kg AR-4 air-to-surface missile up to 20 km when launched from a height of 7,000 meters.

More impressive, the Scorpion can launch at least three types of cruise missiles including the AR-3 cruise missile (100 kg) which has a miniature turbojet engine that can cruise at least 100 km for up to 30 minutes putting many of Taiwan’s military bases on the eastern side of the country at risk.

BZK-005 photo. (igeng.com photo)

BZK-005 Long Eagle reconnaissance drone

The BZK-005 Long Eagle is a high-altitude and long-range UAV reconnaissance turbo-prop aircraft. The PLA Navy and PLA Air Force use this drone. The Long Eagle has a satellite link and has options for optic-electric sensors, synthetic aperture radar, and signals intelligence collection. The latter two options allow the drone to conduct its mission in inclement weather.

The Long Eagle can cruise at 150-180 km/hour, fly up to 40 hours, has a service ceiling of 8,000 meters, maximum takeoff weight is approximately 1,200 kg, and has a max payload of 150 kg. The baseline BZK-005 is unarmed and functions as a reconnaissance platform.

Another variant is “configured for wide-area intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) missions with an under nose synthetic aperture radar (SAR) radome … with a dual-mode SAR/ground moving target indicator (GMTI) capability – and a mid-mounted ventral electro-optical/infrared (EO/IR) turret.”

BZK-005C with weapons attached to pylons (China Defense photo)

BZK-005C armed reconnaissance drone

The BZK-005C upgraded variant is an attack drone (also designated as TYW-1) that has an integrated surveillance and strike capability. According to Chinese media, the TYW-1 can carry a 370 kg payload, has four underwing pylons for weapons payloads, has a similar service ceiling, and flight endurance of 40 hours as the other variants.

The PLA used the Long Eagle, first sighted in 2004, in the so-called “South China Sea” (SCS), around Japan, and near Taiwan. As early as April 2016, a BZK-005 was detected on Woody Island in the SCS.

Woody Island (CSIS photo)

BZK-005 Long Eagle and Japan

On Sept. 9, 2013, China and Japan came close to war during an incident with a Long Eagle over the Diaoyutai / Senkaku (D/S) Islands in the East China Sea. Taiwan, China, and Japan all claim the D/S Islands.

According to the Center for the Study of the Drone at Bard College (U.S.), the PLA flew a “BZK-005 unarmed surveillance drone over the Senkaku Islands. In response, Japan scrambled an F-15 fighter jet, which monitored, but did not fire at the BZK-005. China declared that if Japan shot down a Chinese unmanned aerial vehicle, it would constitute ‘an act of war.’

The incident marked a low-point in Sino-Japanese relations, and brought the two countries closer to physical engagement than any other incident in recent memory. It was the first high-profile instance of China’s use of unmanned aircraft for airborne surveillance over hostile areas.”

Does the PLA plan to provoke Taiwan in an analogous manner?

Air-to-air missile threat

One of the concerns the Taiwanese Air Force might be the possibility that the PLA can arm the Scorpion or the Long Eagle with air-to-air missiles, just as the MQ-1 Predator can be armed with AIM-92 Stinger missiles and the MQ-9 can be armed with the AIM-9X Sidewinder air-to-air missile. In other words, the PLA drones could also “bite back” if attacked.

Drone operations

The main “peacetime” mission of these drone operations is to collect intelligence, conduct surveillance and reconnaissance. The PLA drones have payloads that collect imagery, electronic, communications, and technical intelligence.

Training

Another purpose for the drone operations is to train personnel to operate the system from afar. Training includes maneuvering the aircraft to the correct path and altitude, and familiarizing pilots, and sensor and weapons operators with the target area. The area familiarization includes the terrain, and military and civilian patterns of behavior.

PLA analysts will look for changes before, during, and after a military exercise or other military activities. These indicators could detect an increased alert status of opposing military forces.

Conclusions and recommendations

Taiwan’s political and military leadership should take a PLA drone circling Taiwan more seriously and consider direct and indirect “grey zone” countermeasures. Military commanders should provide military options to political leaders.

Political leaders should know their military options before a crisis occurs. Military operators should be aware of the intelligence collected while these drones are flying.

The PLA will increase the frequency of drone operations to close PLA intelligence collection gaps. In the worst-case scenario, the PLA will sustain 24-hour seven days a week coverage of key targets of interest using similar orbits along the eastern coast of Taiwan and other locations.

Military deception is a concern since these drone missions along Taiwan’s eastern coast could easily transition from intelligence collection to battle damage assessment (BDA) conducted during a conflict. Both PLA drones can carry weapons, and they can strike targets during the first wave of an attack and be available for dynamic targeting during wartime.

The PLA can use drones as a psychological weapon. For example, PLA drones could release propaganda pamphlets along the eastern coastline intended to lower morale of the military and the civilian population.

The PLA could use the drones to provide covert logistics support to fifth columnists in the country. Larger drones could refuel PLA aircraft flying near Taiwan’s east coast.

The aerial drones could signal the deployment of other types of drones such as PLAN unmanned surface vehicles and unmanned underwater vehicles.

PLA challenges 12-mile territorial waters claim

As shown in the Janes map (above), the BZK-005 flew over Taiwan’s southwestern territorial waters (less than 12-miles off Orchid Island) on April 27 and May 2. Neither Taiwan’s MND nor Taiwan’s political leadership mentioned this violation. This inaction signals weakness and emboldens the PLA to continue its aggressive behavior of encroaching on Taiwan’s national territory.

The PLA will fly drones over territorial waters and over cities and bases to assess the resolve of Taiwan’s political and military leadership.

Senior Taiwan officials should think about countermeasures and a communications strategy to ensure that the Taiwanese population is well informed about these drone operations around Taiwan and the deterrence measures the Taiwanese government is taking to counter PLA’s continuous intrusions. Allies and partners should also assist Taiwan in deterring the PLA by their presence near or in Taiwan.

Here is one simple counter measure against PLA drones. Taiwan should fly drones near China’s coastline and then fly a drone into China’s territorial waters just as the PLA has already done against Taiwan. Let the PLA shoot the drone down. The next time the PLA flies a drone within Taiwan’s territorial waters, Taiwan should shoot down the PLA drone.

Deterrence failure?

Unless Taiwan shoots down the next drone that passes into Taiwan’s territorial waters, Taiwan will not deter China. Deterrence only works when a country or a group of countries clearly communicates its red lines to the aggressor and has the capacity and capability to act.

Remember: China follows Vladimir Lenin’s dictum: “You probe with bayonets: if you find mush, you push. If you find steel, you withdraw.”