TAICHUNG (Taiwan News) — Since its founding in 2019, the Taiwan People’s Party (TPP) has largely defined itself as neither the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) nor the Kuomintang (KMT). The TPP styled itself as a more rational, pragmatic, and science-driven middle ground between the two.
As explored in a previous column, the party is taking active steps to define what it stands for. In January, a party think tank was established to produce a white paper, but in speeches and interviews with TPP Chair Ko Wen-je (柯文哲) and other party figures, details emerged about the party's direction.
In yesterday’s column, we explored that on three key issues, not accepting the 1992 Consensus, rejecting “one China,” and explicitly embracing a Taiwanese identity, the party is in the mainstream of public opinion. Though the terminology differs somewhat, it does not conceptually differ from the light-green side of the DPP.
However, details produce a more complicated picture of where the TPP sees itself on the political spectrum, and what solutions it would offer in dealing with Beijing. Ko believes the DPP is too “pro-war” in dealing with Beijing, while the KMT is “too deferential.”
While all parties have called for dialogue with China, Ko’s tone sounds closer to the light-blue wing of the KMT. Ko seems more positive about interactions with China than the DPP.
Stigmatized "1992 Consensus"
For example, Ko has talked about being a bridge between the U.S. and China and wants to avoid Taiwan being a chess piece in the conflict between the two powers, but he also says China’s behavior has pushed Taiwan closer to Washington. Ko has made clear he favors continuing forward with the current good relationship with Washington, which he views positively.
He also wants to engage in dialogue to “reduce enmity” and vows not to “provoke” Beijing. The problem is that Beijing has made accepting the “1992 Consensus” a precondition for any talks, but Ko and the TPP do not recognize it.
Ko is aware of this issue but points out that the “1992 Consensus” has become stigmatized in Taiwan. He objects to its content and calls on the Chinese to come up with another formula.
Ko is hoping that his party doesn’t provoke the same ire in Beijing that the DPP does. Ko might even get his wish, as there have been talks that Xi Jinping (習近平) has tasked Wang Huning (王滬寧), the no. 4 official in the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), with re-examing the “one country, two systems” formula and even possibly the “1992 Consensus.”
The problem is that no matter what new formula the CCP comes up with, it will almost certainly contain the concept of “one China." That would not be any more popular with Taiwanese voters and, by extension, the TPP.
On cross-strait relations, Ko has adopted a policy of “Five Mutuals. These include mutual acknowledgment, mutual understanding, mutual respect, mutual cooperation, and the most difficult to establish, according to Ko, mutual absolution.
No choice but status quo
Ko believes that Taiwan has no choice but to maintain the status quo. He says China will not allow Taiwan independence and Washington will not allow unification.
He predicts that the hostilities between the U.S. and China will last for the next 15 years, so Taiwan’s status quo will be locked in. He states that “over 90%” of Taiwanese support the status quo, which is not entirely accurate, but his point that a vast majority do is correct.
Other than dialogue, Ko and the party have been discussing defense. He has stated repeatedly that "our stance is that we should prepare for war so that we will not be afraid of one."
Although Ko has said, “Of course I want peace,” he has repeatedly emphasized protecting Taiwan’s autonomy, adding “if you encroach on my bottom line, I’ll just have to fight you.” He has called for increased military spending, although he mistakenly seems to think it is still below 2% of GDP.
On increasing conscription from four months to one year, Ko says that it would be useless if the training is not improved. The TPP legislative caucus has also been pressuring the government on this point.
Ko wants to go even further and extend conscription beyond a year, noting that national defense comes with a price. Considering his strongest support base is younger voters, he may end up backtracking on that, however.
Pointing out that the U.S. has not sent troops to defend Ukraine, Ko believes that Taiwan must prepare to defend itself and not assume the Americans will do so. In the face of repeated delays in U.S. arms shipments to Taiwan, the TPP legislative caucus is also advocating to further develop the local defense industry.
Intriguing proposal
Intriguingly, Ko is proposing a national convention to try to reach a domestic consensus on dealing with China. He referenced former President Lee Tung-hui’s (李登輝) 1990 convention that was supposed to handle the “10,000-year” lawmakers who had been elected in China in 1947 and had conveniently kept their seats due to problems with holding elections in their constituencies.
Unfortunately, not much detail was given, but there are issues where a consensus might be reached. Currently, all major parties are campaigning on defending Taiwan’s sovereignty under the name Republic of China, on strong defense capabilities, and resisting attempts by China to limit Taiwan’s international space.
While there is no guarantee of success, there are many areas of common ground and it would help unify the country if all parties could get behind some common principles. Deep blues and greens would hate it of course, but it is a creative idea and worth a try.
Overall, the TPP and Ko’s stances are somewhere in the middle between the KMT and the DPP. He might be a bit more hawkish than both, but until the upcoming white paper is released it will be hard to say for sure.
To Ko's credit, he is giving more specific details than either the KMT Chair Eric Chu (朱立倫) or DPP Chair Lai Ching-te (賴清德). Though Lai has stated his cross-strait policies will be the same as President Tsai Ing-wen’s (蔡英文), so in his case, we know what to expect.
