TAICHUNG (Taiwan News) — After the Sunflower Movement in 2014, Taiwan saw a sea change in politics. The center of gravity moved away from pan-blue ideology and put what had previously been considered light-green ideology right into the center of mainstream public opinion.

Beyond what the polling numbers showed, there was also a cultural shift. People became more aware of their own unique Taiwanese identity and took more pride in it.

With the growth of Taiwanese identity, awareness of the importance of democracy and sovereignty grew along with it. In light of this increased awareness, the U.S. came to be viewed in a better light and suspicion of China increased significantly, especially in light of Secretary-General Xi Jinping’s (習近平) increasingly authoritarian rule.

These trends continued to expand their reach right up through the 2020 national elections. That election saw a unprecedented 70% turnout among voters in the 20-29 demographic.

The expectation was that these trends would continue on that trajectory. However, the reality is somewhat different than expected.

Young voters abandoning DPP in droves

The 20-29 demographic is abandoning the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) in droves. Their attitudes on a variety of issues are more mixed and nuanced than what the expectations were, in some cases continuing the previous trends, but in other cases reversing them.

In researching for yesterday’s column on Ma Ying-jeou’s (馬英九) trip to China, one poll was cited that showed 39.2% of people approved of his trip. However, 40% of the 20-29 demographic approved of it, or slightly higher than the average for the entire population.

That is contrary to the trend of the last decade. What is going on here?

Examining the numbers in the latest March edition of the My-Formosa poll, the only regular poll to provide breakdowns by age, reveals some insights. The generation most impacted by the Sunflower Movement is noticeably more pan-green.

But it has been nine years since the Sunflower Movement and that demographic is largely now in the 30-39 age bracket. Their younger siblings largely don’t remember it, and many have only really come to understand politics during the seven years of the Tsai Ing-wen (蔡英文) administration.

The difference between the younger generation and the Sunflower generation is starkly illustrated by their responses to the question of whether they feel positively or negatively towards the DPP. The Sunflower generation had, as expected, by far the highest positive feelings and the lowest negative feelings towards the DPP than any other age group.

High contrast

By contrast, the 20-29 age bracket had the highest negative and lowest positive feelings towards the DPP, though in both cases only by a small margin over the 40-49 demographic. When it comes to positive and negative perceptions of the Kuomintang (KMT), the Sunflower generation is sharply more negative and less positive than any other age group.

The 20-29 demographic, however, is only 2.2% less positive on the KMT and 1.9% more negative than the average across all age groups.

They are also by far the most distrusting of the U.S. of any demographic, with those saying that the U.S. does not attach importance to Taiwan being 14.5% higher than the average across all age groups.

That is in very sharp contrast with the Sunflower generation, which led all demographics and was 13.9% more likely than the 20-29 demographic to say that the U.S. does attach importance to Taiwan.

That isn’t to say that the younger generation are anti-American. Some 51.8% of the younger generation thinks the U.S. does attach importance to Taiwan. That is, however, tied for the lowest number with the 70+ demographic, which is the group that is most likely to remember U.S. support for the People’s Republic of China (PRC) taking the “China” seat in the United Nations and the U.S. cutting diplomatic ties with Taiwan in the 1970s, as well as helping to prop up the dictatorship of Chiang Kai-shek (蔣介石).

While this distrust of the U.S. is counter to the trend of the last decade, the young recorded the highest negative feelings towards the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), just slightly ahead of the Sunflower generation (88.3% vs. 87%) and roughly tied (8% vs. 7.3%) having positive feelings. That has been on trend for the last decade.

Not going to the KMT in droves

The picture that these numbers paint is that the younger generation is less pan-green and is definitely moving away from the DPP, but only moving toward the pan-blue camp and the KMT in moderate numbers.

Unfortunately, the My-Formosa poll doesn’t ask about positive and negative feelings towards the Taiwan People’s Party (TPP), but all indications are that many are now moving in their direction.

This was evidenced in the local elections last November. They were by far the strongest supporters of the TPP’s Ann Kao (高虹安) in Hsinchu City and the TPP-backed (and now TPP member) Vivian Huang (黃珊珊) in Taipei.

In a hypothetical presidential matchup between the KMT’s Hou Yu-ih (侯友宜), the DPP’s Lai Ching-te (賴清德) and the TPP’s Ko Wen-je (柯文哲), this pattern plays out again. Their least favorite candidate is Hou at 23.1%, which is 3.1% lower than the average across all age groups, but 5.9% higher than the Sunflower generation.

Again, that suggests some movement back towards the KMT compared to their older siblings, but in moderate numbers. Lai is their favorite candidate at 26.2%, which is 12.2% lower than the average across all age groups.

Ko is by far their favorite candidate at 35.4%, which is 15.1% higher than across all age groups. That’s roughly equivalent to the amounts that are lower than the average for the KMT (-3.1%) and the DPP (-12.2%), which combined is 15.3%.

Anyone but Lai

That this generation is not making big moves towards the KMT, but is abandoning the DPP in droves is sharply illustrated in a hypothetical matchup between only Hou and Lai, with Ko not in the picture. Only 33% would support Lai, which is significantly 10.4% lower than the average across all demographics. 47% would support Hou, which is roughly tied for the highest demographic backing him and 5.7% higher than the average.

About 15-20% still haven't made up their minds, and while we don’t know who they’ll end up supporting, it is pretty clear that over half of the younger generation doesn’t support the DPP, and if the election were held now, would vote for anyone but the DPP's candidate. That is a sea change from 2020, when President Tsai won the youth vote in a landslide.

A few weeks ago, during a lecture at the Political Science Department of Tunghai University, participants were asked why the younger generation thought the TPP was so much more popular with their generation.

Whilst surprisingly no participant seemed to think the question odd, they simply accepted the premise of the question as fact, the TPP was much more popular with their generation.

Participants also felt that the TPP is above pan/blue politics, they are practical and problem-solving oriented and get things done.

Smart messaging

Interestingly, one participant highlighted the role of messaging, pointing out that the TPP’s messaging was very clear and direct. The participant also pointed out that their generation gets their information from social media and not from the pan-blue or green press.

In other words, the TPP was doing a good job getting their messaging out to this generation and bypassing traditional media. Of course, that has a snowball effect. The more popular something becomes, the more it gets passed on.

Clearly, this younger generation is either tired of the DPP or feels let down by the Tsai administration, or both. They are also moving in a different direction politically than the generation before them.

They are more cynical than the Sunflower generation.

The Sunflower Movement seized the legislature, filled the streets with hundreds of thousands of people, and in the end stared down the Ma administration and forced them to abandon legislation that would have opened Taiwan’s economy wide open to China.

They participated. They won. They made change happen. That made them believers.

The younger generation has never experienced that and is demographically smaller than the generations before them. They don’t see that they will make any great change, and don’t feel particularly empowered.

The closest they can get to doing so is to rebel against the two main parties, especially the DPP, and try to effect change that way.

Lai Ching-te knows the DPP has a problem and has been working to reach out to the younger generation, but clearly so far without much success.