TAIPEI (Taiwan News) — Ian Easton of the U.S.-based think tank Project 2049 says Taichung Harbor is the most suitable landing point for a People's Liberation Army (PLA) invasion in a recent report on the risks of a Chinese amphibious attack.
The expert says that harbors are more effective sites for amphibious landings than beaches since they enable supplies and equipment to be swiftly offloaded, giving Chinese forces a more secure foothold in the country, according to UDN.
Easton warns that Chinese-made equipment installed at Taiwanese harbors could be used to gather intelligence on port operations and give Chinese war planners an edge in designing the optimal attack. He says equipment made by Shanghai-based Zhenhua Port Machinery Co., whose devices have been installed at Kaohsiung's harbor, poses a strategic vulnerability for this reason.
Easton recently released a report titled "Hostile Harbors: Taiwan’s Ports and PLA Invasion Plans," outlining possible PLA strategies for an amphibious landing on Taiwan's main island.
He points out that while amphibious landings are difficult, they cannot be ruled out as a final resort should other strategies, such as airstrikes or a naval blockade, fail to force Taiwan to surrender.
Easton observed that Taiwan has few beaches suited for amphibious landings and that the success of a Chinese invasion may therefore depend on whether the PLA can secure a harbor so it can smoothly offload tanks and heavy artillery from invasion fleet vessels and rapidly deploy them further inland. He says the flat terrain around Taichung makes it the most strategically advantageous harbor to capture, though Kaohsiung, Taipei, and Anping harbors may also be targets.
Easton notes that the tight military defenses at Keelung and Su'ao make them more difficult to capture.
Institute for National Defense and Security Research (INDSR) scholar Su Tzu-yun (蘇紫雲) said in an interview on Wednesday (Aug. 3) that Taichung and Taipei's ports are the most critical because the PLA can quickly reach the Ching Chuan Kang Airport and push north to take over Hsinchu’s military bases, paralyzing Taiwan’s two largest defense facilities in one maneuver. While the Port of Taipei may place invading forces within striking range of the capital, it does not have the topographical advantage of open flatlands that Taichung has.
Su says seizing Taiwan’s ports would both give Chinese forces the element of surprise and shift the point of attack to an unconventional location. Su says that since ports are narrower than beaches, Taiwan cannot apply conventional anti-amphibious attack thinking to defend such areas.
He adds that China's strategy here would combine both conventional and non-conventional tactics aimed not at Taiwan's troops but at denying Taiwanese forces access to the ports, giving Chinese forces space to come ashore.
Indeed, an excerpt from a Chinese military study that Easton translated and lists in the report reads:
"If ports are damaged in combat… in the course of executing operations to seize them… well then, occupying those ports means nothing… We must do our utmost to ensure the least possible damage is done to port infrastructure."
INDSR Ou Hsi-fu’s (歐錫富) recent analysis, released on July 29, says the PLA’s amphibious force is the primary target of Taiwan’s asymmetric defense since it poses the greatest threat to the country. He notes that while China’s amphibious capacity has grown quickly in recent years, it still suffers from critical shortages, such as transmission power for air-cushioned landing craft and limited helicopter production.
Ou says Taiwan must continue to be vigilant in observing the PLA’s movements in this area and move quickly to counter new capabilities as they develop.